NAVAL ATTACHE'S REPORTS

O.N.I.

JANUARY *1915*

January - 1915 - T1

Need not be returned.

Translated from the Berliner-Tageblatt of 3 January, 1915.

ON BOARD THE CRUISER "LEIPZIG"

A letter of an eye witness of the sea-fight off the Chilean Coast.

The Naval Chief Engineer of the Cruiser "LEIPZIG" which went down in the heroicly fought battle near the Falkland Islands, Karl Edw. Hahn, on the day following the great sea-fight off the Chilean Coast, wrote the following letter to his wife living in Dansig:

In the vicinity of Valparaiso,
2 November.

My dear Wife :-

Today I can at last report something. You will surely already have seen in the papers that yesterday on the first of November we had our first fight. At last the fulfilment of my longing! For this cruising about without any real accomplishment was cruel for me. Sunday at four o'clock in the afternoon we could expect to be in the vicinity of Coronel. Just before, during the night at twelve o'clock, I had a small accident in one engine by the blowing out of a packing, which in two hours was made good again, without difficulty, so that we could steam through the twelve hour run smoothly. Sunday forenoon there was another mishap in the machinery. Still the engines have made under me 10 million revolutions, which otherwise would not have been done in three years. It was possible, however, to get everything in order so that I could sit down to the table with confidence. The Captain ate with us, and we ate and drank once more, moderately but well. At three o'clock I laid down on the sofa, read my beloved Ibsen and thought of my Erika. At four I got up and instinctively dressed myself for action. In the forenoon we had been detached to chase a small vessel, which, however, proved to be a Chilean. Shortly before noon, the Nurnberg was sent off after another small vessel, which was really an Englishman and was taken by her, by which naturally she fell out of sight. In the afternoon, the Dresden was then sent after a steamer, which also proved to be neutral. The Dresden was thereby far separated from us. So at four o'clock the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and we were steaming in column. We sat in the mess and drank our coffee, then came the order "Leipzig examine the steamer coming in sight." We made our jokes about it and I said, "I hope that is at last a ship of war." Then came the word, "Clear ship for action." The steamer had been recognized as an English cruiser. Now we went to stations, the final oversight of all preparations took up the next hour. As still nothing came, shortly before five o'clock I came on deck. There they were one after another "Two cruisers, three cruisers - four ships in sight". And soon they were made out as the English armored cruisers "Good Hope","Normouth", the small cruiser "Glasgow" and an auxiliary cruiser. Previously the matter was none too serious for us, but now it took another aspect. The two armored cruisers were a little inferior to our big brothers, the "Glasgow" against us somewhat superior, and the auxiliary cruiser, in the absence of the "Dresden" and "Nurnberg", made one over against us. At about 5:30 the action begun. On account of the weather conditions, sun, and very heavy weather, we were obliged to steam at high speed against the enemy. It took an hour for us to close from

meters to 7900 meters. At 6:35 the first shot fell. The engines roared and pounded. Every moment the heavy sea threw the screws out of the water and then the machinery raced so that it made me anxious. It is awfully hard in such serious moments to have the full weight of responsibility. On the other hand it diverts one from unnecessary considerations. A joy to me were my men. Calm and easy, as ever in maneuvers, they performed their duty, while the roar of our shot and the deep boom of the 8-inchers of our big brothers went on. Here and there the different sounds of the hostile shots mixed in as they fell in the water before us. So the minutes ran. After a half an hour there was a little pause, at least for us. After ten minutes more came the news, "One Englishman is afire", and a few minutes later "A big Englishman is exploding." What had happened was, immediately after the second salvo the "Good Hope" began to burst out into flames, which in the course of the fight showed anew at different points, so that in the end she was all ablaze. On board the "Monmouth" towards the end of the fight an explosion took place. Apparently a powder magazine had blown up - a column of flame 30 meters high, 20 meters wide, was thrown up, intermixed with blue, green, and red tongues of flame and followed by a thick smoke cloud. This smoke cloud was unfortunately supported by a heavy black rainbow, which enveloped the enemy and concealed it entirely from our sight.

I forgot to mention that the "Dresden" was coming after us at utmost speed and joined in the fight, upon which the English auxiliary cruiser immediately disappeared. So we were then without a trace of the enemy in the darkness of night, and we specially got the order to prepare for torepdo attack. Then we had to prepare on every side, following first one then another suspected shadow, making it a very risky situation. Finally we found ourselves in the midst of four ships, without any idea whether we had to do with friend or foe. Naturally we did not dare to make any recognition signals - in brief, it was quite uncomfortable. At last the "Scharnhorst" was recognized and assembled us.

A half hour before, on the horizon, a short but heavy firing had taken place. The Nurnberg had run upon the heeled over "Monmouth", not yet sunk in spite of the heavy explosion, and had with rapid fire destroyed her, so that she sank, bottom up, with her 680 men. This was the final event. What became of the burning "Good Hope" we know nothing. The "Glasgow" certainly escaped with a few light hits; also the auxiliary cruiser. We sought them still through the night, but had no success. Our injuries were : "Leipzig - one flag halyard shot through. The "Scharnhorst" had one shot strike the bow and make a small hole; also one smokepipe has a small hole. The "Gneisenau" received one ineffective hit on the armor. The "Dresden" and "Nurnberg" nothing. Now we await the next series of Englishmen.

You see, my dear wife, we can do something. So be of good cheer and trust in the future.

Need not be returned.

WEEKLY POLITICAL SUMMARY

Translation: BERLINER TAGEBLATT, January 3, ~~1914.~~ 1915.

The End of the Year and Year of War -- The Holiday Week in the East -- The Prisoners of War -- The Note of Protest of the United States -- Japanese Auxiliary troops -- What does it Mean?

----------PAUL MICHAELIS.

The present year's ending shows more than ever before no conclusion of events. Even the arbitrary ending of the year scarcely justifies events. The domestic and political developments are not determined by the New Year's bells or greetings. At this season it is apparent that in place of the usual year, a year of war is upon us, which began on the first day of mobilization, August 2nd. When it will end, we cannot today definitely say. Only so much is certainand that is that all that has happened in the past seven months lies behind us in an unreal glare. How could we have more strongly interested ourselves in the petty days quarrel which happened before the beginning of the war. Why should the "status quo ante" concern us today? It is all different and new. Only political children can believe that after the war conditions can be the same as previously. Either it will be better or worse than formerly. But one is certain that what has passed does not return. We find in these unalterable facts that the past was brilliant and on this account its illumination of the future can only be unimportant.

In this first week of the New Year, all is in full swing. In the East the Christmas celebration did not once bring a cessation of fighting because Russia, as in many other things, is several weeks behind Western Europe in the reckoning of time. Especially bitter has been the daily fighting on the battlefields of Poland. The wintry fog has more than anything else caused a pause. The battle of the legions, however, progresses. The magnitude of these battles is shown from the number of Russian prisoners, which amount to 136,000 since November 11th, not to speak of the spoils of war. Despite the above, the subjugation of the Russian Army has not proceeded as quickly as has been hoped for. In West Galicia the masses of Russians have temporarily retaken territory. We can at least say without conceit that the situation is more and more favorable to the Germans and their Allies. General Field Marshall v. Hindenburg has reminded his soldiers "Now further forwards; as in 1914, so in 1915". We are happily convinced that this watchword will have results.

In the West we cannot so definitely prophesy since the difficult and continuous fighting has resulted in a general offensive position. However, the great number of prisoners is promising. To the 300,000 Russian officers and men taken prisoners there is to be added over 275,000 French, English and Belgian prisoners. The question has been opportunely raised whether these hundreds of thousands of prisoners shall "eat the hair on their heads". Feeding them certainly complicates the domestic food problem. We can, however, not overlook the fact that every single enemy removed as a fighting unit renders the difficult task of our troops easier and that when peace is concluded prisoners will be an important weight in the German scale. We can say further that in the West isolated successes are daily reported. The spirit of our troops is splendid and their bravery incomparable. We can also share the trust which the Kaiser has enunciated in his New Year's greeting to the Army and Navy: "Altho the time and task are difficult, we can look with complete confidence in the future."

So much is certain, that our enemies, especially England, did not have to think long before recognizing the German superiority. They look about on all sides for help and attempt to pile Ossa on Pelion in order to decide favorably this battle of giants.

The United States has joined the opposition as expressed in the recent meeting of the Northern States against the lack of consideration which the English have shown at sea and Mr. Wilson has shown a stronger energy in defending American business against the encroachments of the English. It is true that the American note was not couched in terms friendly to Germany. However, this has not prevented the result of placing a suppression on the piratical policy of England.

The French Republic seems to have found hope in the call sent to Japan for help. The smart Japanese statesmen demanded a price which the wary French politicians are reluctant to pay. Even if this should materialize at the cost of the far eastern possession of France, we need have no fear. It has been already demonstrated that the exotic auxiliary troops of our enemies, should they come here, wherever they wish, are not acquainted with modern warfare. The Japanese are, in spite of their famous adaptability to environment, not yet Europeanized. First the new elections in Japan will show how far the mass of people will permit themselves to be driven on the hazardous grounds of adventurous politics. Even if the Allies should conclude this arrangement with Japan, we can view this with calmness. Leading into the lair of the lion are many trails, but none are to be seen coming forth.

The less clear the future is at the end of the year, the more the question arises: "What will it be?" The question at Whitsunday is the question at the New Year. There is no reason why we should now discuss the new division of the world. This comes later. Our enemies can amuse themselves with this - they have already on paper with remarkable zeal dismembered the German Empire and have divided it up. Every day the problem is more urgent, in what manner we shall meet the new conditions which at first were not present but which now confront us. We can recognize the new order of things when we appreciate the numerous soldiers who formerly were reckoned amongst the Social Democrats and now are decorated with the Iron Cross. Many of them return as officers. The conditions are similar amongst the youth of the Jewish population, who under the pressure have become military. Of the millions who are under arms, many thousands will find a grave in foreign lands and many more will be crippled because of the war, but we trust that the majority will return well and ready for work. The war has resulted in advancing the political education of the German people. To many conditions must be different from the period before the war - different on social and domestic grounds and different in the distribution of the political right. The moment when this new period is ready will not long be postponed.

WEEKLY POLITICAL SUMMARY

The Year's Beginning and WAR YEAR - Christmas Week in the East - The War Prisoners - The Note of Protest of the United States - Japanese Auxiliary Troops - What shall it be ?

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By Paul Michaelis

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Translated from Berliner-Tageblatt of Sunday, 3 January, 1915.

The changing of the civil year meant this time less than ever a winding up of events. And otherwise also the arbitrary division made by the calendar on the 1st of January will scarcely be justified by affairs. The economical and political development is not to be determined by Sylvester bells and New Year's wishes. This time it was quite clear that in the place of the civil year is the war year, which began on the 2d of August with the first mobilization day. When it will end it is impossible to say with any certainty today. Only so much is certain, that everything that has come to pass in the last seven months lies behind us in the shadowy light. How could we still retain any strong interest in the small and often petty daily strife of before the war. What do we care today for the whole "status quo ante". It is all changed and new. Only children in politics can believe that after the war relations can be the same as before. Either it will be better than it was, or it will be even worse. But we should everywhere understand that what is past will not return again. In this unalterable fact we can find ourselves all the more as the past was no less than brilliant and accordingly its illumining power for the future can be only very limited.

In this first week of the New Year, all is in flux. In the East, the Christmas festival could not once bring even a temporary interruption of the fighting, because forsooth Russia, as in so many other things, is in time reckoning some weeks behind Western Europe. In Poland especially, the contests on the battlefields have been bitterly fought day by day. At the most, only the winter fogs have given the troops an occasional respite. But the great battle as such kept on. How great were and are the levie's taking part in this battle is shown by the great number of Russian prisoners, which in this period of fighting alone since the 11th of November hafe amounted to 136,600 men, not to mention the other captured booty. Nevertheless, we must make up our minds to the fact that it has not gone so rapidly with the vanquishment of the Russian army as has been hoped in some quarters. In Western Galacia the Russian army has even been able to gain ground for a time. But without exaggeration this much at least may be said that the war situation has turned more and more in favor of the German army and its allies. That does not prevent, in the meantime, that the decision will not come until the New Year. Field Marshall von Hindenburg has cheered his men on with "Now at them again, all fresh, as in 1914, so also in 1915". We may happily feel assured that action will correspond to these words.

In the West one can perhaps predict less definitely, when the arduous and tedious stationary fighting of the last month will give place to a general offensive. But here too the great number of enemy prisoners is significant, for against the aggregate of more than 300,000 captured Russian officers and men, there were more than 275,000 French, English, and Belgians taken. The question pertinently arises whether these hundreds of thousands of prisoners will not eat the hair off our

cats; and certainly the subsistence problem for the German people is made considerably more difficult by these table companions. One must not overlook the fact, though, that every enemy put out of action lightens the difficult task for our troops, and that in the conclusion of peace, the number of prisoners will bear a very significant weight in the German scale. It may be said further that in the West single successes daily have not been wanting. And what will mean more, here also the spirit of the troops is excellent, their courage incomparable. So every one may share the confidence which the Kaiser has expressed in his New Year Greeting to the Army and Fleet: "Though the time is serious and the problem before us difficult, we may look with full and firm confidence into the future." May the New Year be able to bring the severe fighting to fruition.

So much is certain, that our enemies, and especially England, only recently begin to appreciate the German superiority. They look about for help on every side, and seek to pile Ossa on Pelion in order to cut short this titanic struggle as favorably as possible; but they cannot help themselves further without encroaching still further upon the neutrals. To the opposition of the North countries against the English regardlessness on the sea the United States of America have now joined, and Mr. Wilson has resorted to somewhat stronger vigor to protect American business against English encroachment. The American note was certainly not meant in aspirit of friendliness to Germany. That need not prevent, however, its placing a damper upon England's piratic policy. Likewise it appears that the French Republic has found a flaw in the introduction of Japanese auxiliary troops. The crafty Japanese statesmen named a price to pay which makes the hair of the more circumspect French politicians stand on end. Yet even should the affair come to an agreement, at the cost of the Farther Indian possessions of France, we need not allow ourselves to be frightened. It has already been demonstrated that the exotic auxiliary troops of our enemies, come whence they will, cannot take part in modern war. The Japanese also, in spite of their fabulous adaptability will yet be a long time before becoming Europeanized. It must first be shown, however, by the Japanese election how far the mass of people are willing to go up the incline of an adventurous policy. But even should the compact of the Triple Entente with Japan be concluded, we may regard the matter with quiet composure. To the lion's den many trails lead in, but none out.

The less the turn of the year allows the future to be seen, the stronger the question presses: What will come to pass? The Whitsuntide question has this time become the New Year question. Not at all in the sense that we are already discussing the new partitioning of the world. That will come later. For the present let our enemies amuse themselves with that, who have already with noteworthy zeal covered the long-suffering paper with the destruction and dividing up of the German Empire. The problem, however, becomes every day more urgent, how shall we comfort ourselves in regard to the new relations which are not yet to come but are already here. One can recognize the new ordering of things quite openly in observing that numerous soldiers who have hitherto been counted as Social-Democrats have been decorated with the Iron Cross. Many of them will come back as officers. Among the youth of the Jewish part of the population, which has likewise been held under military pressure, conditions are similar. But the matter is not confined to such parts of the population. Of the millions fighting in the field, thousands and thousands find their graves in foreign land; other thousands will carry lasting injury from the war. But the mass will, as we may hope, return home sound and able to work. They will demand their right to live as well as a voice in the shaping and renovating of the German Empire. Education in politics has made great strides forward among the German people by means of the war. It must become very different from what it was before the beginning of the war, different also in the distribution of political rights. The moment to prepare for this new time ought not to be too long postponed.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

Contents noted
B. A. Fiske
Need not be returned.

SUBJECT EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT COURT-MARTIAL OF REAR-ADMIRAL E.C.J. TROUBRIDGE, R. N.

From Y (c) *No.* 2 *Date* January 5, 1915.

Replying to O. N. I. No. *Date*

1. On reliable authority I have been informed that during the Court-Martial of Rear-Admiral E.C.J. Troubridge, R. N., for permitting the GOEBEN to escape, it developed that Admiral Troubridge had received a radio message in the secret code of the British Navy, which message, as was subsequently found out, had originated on the GOEBEN.

2. In obedience to the orders contained in this message, he made his dispositions such that the GOEBEN eluded him. On this evidence he was acquitted of the charges preferred against him.

3. This is the second time - and from different sources, both supposedly reliable - I have heard that at the outbreak of the war, the German government was in possession of the secret code of the British Navy.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

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Need not be returned.

SUBJECT GERMAN NAVAL RAID ON EAST COAST OF ENGLAND.

From Y *No.* 3 *Date* January 5, 1915.

Replying to O. N. I. No. *Date*

Source of information: The British Naval Attaché, Paris.

1. In the recent German naval raid on the east coast of England, the Admiralty was informed by scouts (the nature of which I was unable to ascertain) when the Germans left their home port, and a heavy naval force was sent to meet the Germans. The only reason the Germans escaped was that by chance a heavy fog settled down, and they were able to elude the British naval forces.

2. The British navy is hoping that the Germans will make a similar attempt soon, and expect it as soon as the present storm in the North Sea is over. They feel confident that they will be able to intercept and destroy the German attacking vessels.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

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SUBJECT BRITISH NAVAL AIR SERVICE SCOUTING.

Need not be returned.

From Y *No.* 4 *Date* January 5, 1915.

Replying to O. N. I. No. *Date*

Source of information: The British Naval Attache, Paris.

1. Through the British Naval Air Service, the British navy has been kept informed of the whereabouts of the German fleet, and they consider this their most valuable source of information.

2. Air scouting is done from parent ships at a base, and a great deal more has been done than ever has appeared in the press.

THE NON-DEPENDABLE BLACK SEA FLEET.

Translation, January 5, 1915.

The correspondent of the RUNDSCHAU reports from Constantinople that within the last few days secret processes against the revolutionary officers and men of the Black Sea Fleet have been begun in different Russian cities, i.e. in Petersburg and Odessa. The indictments before the Naval Court Martial convened at Odessa include thirty-eight charges. The accused, many of whom are line officers and naval surgeons, were serving on board the "ZAR", "ZARITZA", "NADESHDA", "KOMETA", "IMPERATOR NIKOLAI II" and "IMPERATOR ALEXANDER II". Several of the accused had fled to Egypt, where they were apprehended and given over. Recent punishments in marine circles and in the volunteer fleet are mentioned.

THE NON-INDEPENDENT BLOCK AND ALLIES.

Intelligence Report, Series 2, Item.

The correspondent of the KORDSCHAU reports from Constantinople that within the last few days secret processes against the revolutionary officers and men of the Black Sea Fleet have been taken in different Russian cities, i.e. in Sebastopol and Odessa. Indictments before the Heavy Court Martial consisted of charges of mutiny-night orders. The accused, some 50 men in all, were brought before the Heavy Court Martial consisted of charges of mutiny-night orders. The accused, some 50 men in all, were brought before the "SAV," "MARGARAN," "ACHMET," "DERVENDIL KIRCHAI II" and "IMBRAHIM ALIKAMEK II." Several of the accused had fled to Constantinople, where they were apprehended and Kiamil Pasha, acting on behalf of the Sultan, ordered that the prisoners should be

THE DAMAGE TO ENGLISH COMMERCE.

Translation: January 5, 1915.

In an article concerning the danger of mines on the English coast, the "Evening News" advances the belief that in the last attack of the German warships, the bombardment of the English coast was not the chief aim but this attack served the purpose of covering the laying of mines by the German ships. The great number of shipwrecks after the bombardment of Scarborough was caused through mines and shows that English commerce is in a very critical way. Until now there are no official statements concerning the English loss by mines but we can estimate the number of merchantmen lost as over one hundred. The value of these ships and the cargoes lost amounts to at least thirty to forty million Pounds, since there are several steamers which have been destroyed through mines whose cargo alone had a value of over two thousand Pounds. In addition to this are the losses caused by the "EMDEN" which one estimates at from eighty to one hundred million Marks, as well as the hundreds of millions of damage which was caused by the activity of the German cruisers and the auxiliary cruisers. Taking it in all, English commerce has suffered a loss of over two billion Marks through the activity of the German Navy. In conclusion the paper demands that the English Government shall have a corps of ten thousand men whose duty shall be to pick up mines.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

Declined be returned.

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SUBJECT RIVER GUNBOATS.

From Y *No.* 5 *Date* January 6, 1915.

Replying to O. N. I. No. *Date*

The eleven Seine tugboats which were armed with five guns ranging from one- to six-pounders and which were placed under the command of Captain de Slane, Chief of the 1st Section, of the French Navy General Staff, have been paid off, the flotilla disbanded, and Captain de Slane has returned to his office as Chief of the 1st Section, French Navy General Staff.

AIR TORPEDOES.
A New Weapon of our Troops.

Translation: BERLINER MORGENPOST, January 6, 1915.

The Russians have armed a steamer which has performed good work on the Weichsel in preventing the Germans from gaining a foothold on the island at the mouth of the Bzura. The Germans attempt to bombard this boat from the air without success.

On the Rawka the Germans show great activity. Across this stream - 30-35 meters wide - there is a constant duel of all kinds of guns. Large shells have fallen in the Russian trenches leading them to believe that the famous 42 cm. guns are against them. The Germans are firing a new kind of shot from the trenches. The Russian officers have named this new projectile "Air torpedo". They are bombs with a fuse, which by means of an unknown mechanism, explode at a distance of only a few hundred meters, about the distance which the enemies' positions are located on this or that side of the river. The Russians use hand granades.

AIR TORPEDOES.
A New Weapon of our Troops.

Translation: ENGLISH MORNINGPOST, January 6, 1915.

The Russians have armed a steamer which has performed good work on the Vistula in preventing the Germans from gaining a foothold on the island at the mouth of the Sture. The German attempt to bombard this boat from the air without success.

On the Rawka the Germans show great activity. Across this stream - 30-35 meters wide - there is a considerable load of all kinds of guns. Large shells have fallen in the Russian trenches leading them to believe that the famous 42 cm. guns are against them. The Germans are firing a new kind of shot from the trenches. The Russian officers have named this new projectile "air torpedo". They are bombs with a fuse, which by means of an unknown mechanism, explode at a distance of only a few hundred meters, about the distance which the enemies' positions are located on this or that side of the river. The Russians are hard pressed.

American Embassy

L O N D O N.

January 11, 1915.

From: Major Thomas C. Treadwell, U.S.A.

To: Naval Attaché.

Subject: Winter Camps at Salisbury Plain, and Canadian Expeditionary Forces.

CONFIDENTIAL

The undersigned visited Salisbury Plain, and the Canadian camps there on January 5 and 6, and the following report is mainly from observations made, and from information received at that time.

1. Winter Camps at Salisbury Plain.

Salisbury Plain has an extent of about 300 square miles. It embraces an area of open rolling country, sparsely settled and with few fences, the hills rising to not over 100-ft. above the general level. There are numerous camp sites, and target ranges, and the area offers an excellent terrain for camps and manouvers in dry weather, but is not suitable for winter camps.

Salisbury, the headquarters of the Southern Command, and the only town of any size in the vicinity is situated at the south-western part of the plain, and 12 miles to the north of Salisbury is Netheravon, the site of the Army Cavalry School, and now also a centre for aviation.

Soon after the outbreak of the war many units of the New Armies were put in camp at Salisbury Plain, which until the wet weather began, the last of October, made an excellent place for camping and training these new units.

The 19th Division was camped near Bulford and Tidworth (12 miles north of Salisbury); the 25th Division near Codford and the 26th Division near Sylye (12 and 15 miles S.E. of Salisbury); Artillery Brigades were camped at Bulford. Other units of the New Armies were also camped temporarily at Salisbury Plain until they could be sent to permanent stations. The Canadian Contingent of about 30,000 men was camped at West Downs, Bustards and Pond Farm (12 to 16 miles S.W. Of Salisbury) on its arrival in England;; and preparations were made for camping New Zealand contingent, but later developments caused this contingent as well as that from Australia, to be disembarked and held in Egypt. Thus, Salisb ry Plain became, with Aldershot, one of the two chief training centres of Great Britain, and during the fall there were over 100,000 troops camped there, while at other places in the vicinity (Notably Lyndhurst, Winchester, Andover, and Southampton) within radius of 25 miles from Salisbury, were many other troops.

Salisbury - a town of about 22,000 - became a base for the troops camped on the Plain, and distributing centre of a large daily supply of stores, a recreation place for the troops, and the temporary home of thousands of workmen.

These troops were at first camped under canvas, and it was the intention of the War Office to build huts for their ~~ass~~ accomodation during the winter. Owing to the delay in building these huts, however, due to difficulty in procuring labor, bad weather and other causes, the huts are not yet completed, and it has been necessary to move the troops from camp to camp, and to billet many of them in the surrounding towns and villages so that at present there are less than 50,000 men on the Plain of which the greater part belong to the Canadian Contingent. Now many of the soldiers have been moved from the flood and mud of Codford, Bulford, West Downs, Pond Farm and other sites, and are billeted on the towns of Shaftesbury, Verwood, and all through the country to the coast at Winbourne, Broadstone, Poole and Bournemouth.

On January 5 and 6, there were floods at Salisbury, and over the low country in the vicinity, owing tothe heavy rains, and the overflow of the Avon and Nylye Rivers. At places in the main street and other streets of Salisbury, the water was 3-ft. and more deep. The villages at Bulford and Amesbury were also flooded, detours had to be made to reach the camps, only the upper roads could be used, and at places motor and other vehicles had to go through water up to the hubs of the wheels.

The camps at Lark Hill were in a sea of mud, and the spaces between the huts filled with mud and water. ~~xkk~~ At the Bulford Camp where there were 24 batteries of the New Armies engaged in Artillery training, the conditions were better, there being large concrete squares for drill grounds, and hard metalled roads between the huts.

Between Lark Hill and Shrewton, there were sites pegged out for huts at many places, and at the Lark Hill, Hamilton, Fargo and Rollestone Camps, a large number of huts have already been constructed.

Everywhere in this section one may see these camps of huts in the making; blocks of even lines of huts built of wood and iron, on brick foundations, and painted grey, green and brown; built in a sea of mud, and with a ~~little~~ litter of iron and timber about; and in some places there are still camps of conical tents used by troops, whose huts have not yet been put up.

These huts are substantially built of wood and corrugated iron, with iron frames. They are on brick foundations - the latest built on brick pillars - two or three feet above the ground, have a door at one end, and six windows on each side, about 15' x 50' x 10', and are heated with coal stoves. There are 20 huts for a battalion, in two rows with battalion street between. There are also officers, kitchens, mess, canteen, and storage huts. These huts are all built to pattern. The parts are all made by contract and shipped out ready to be put up quickly.

Work is now going on at everything connected with the preparation of the camps at the same time. A railroad is being constructed through the camps, roads repaired, water pipes laid, and huts built. It would seem that the railroad and roads should have been built first, and after the construction of huts undertaken. That by this method time would have been saved, and much confusion, mess and discomfort avoided. The War Office has, of course, been severely taxed to complete the huts for the million or more men of its New Armies, not only at Salisbury Plain, but at many other places, and it now looks as if many of the hut camps at Salisbury Plain would not be completed until the drier weather comes, when the men might as well be in tents. It would no doubt have been better also to have put all the men here in billets before the bad weather set in, and much sickness and discomfort might thus have been avoided, rather than to have trusted to favorable weather conditions; for the weather in England at this time of year with its short days, and large proportion of cold wet days is certainly not likely to be favorable for camping troops, and the conditions this year have been much worse than usual.

II. Canadian Expeditionary Forces.

At the beginning of the war the Dominions of the British Empire were not well prepared for hostilities. There was no common scheme or policy for military and naval defence, and no central authority. Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa had taken up the principle of compulsory service, but the system had been adopted too recently to have much effect, or to increase materially their trained forces. Canada, on the other hand, though her potential strength was greater than that of the other Dominions, had a military system less completely organized. Nothing could be done in any of the Dominions without the voluntary consent of their governments.

When it was found, however, that war was inevitable, the Governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa placed their resources at the service of the Empire. Canada offered its two cruisers - "Niobe" and "Rainbow" - to the Admiralty, and agreed to raise an Expeditionary Force of over 20,000 men to be sent to England, and to supply such further forces as might be required. Australia and New Zealand also offered their ships to the Admiralty, and 20,000 and 8,000 men respectively. An Expeditionary Force could not be sent from South Africa owing to the need of men for defence there, but this Dominion agreed to take over all necessary measures for defence, and thus relieve the British Regular troops stationed there for service elsewhere.

The Expeditionary Forces from Australia and New Zealand were, owing to the entrance of Turkey into the war, disembarked and held in Egypt for its defence, so that the Canadians are the only Dominion troops that have thus far reached England.

The Canadian Military Forces are controlled by a Minister of Defence, aided by a Militia Council similarly constituted to the Army Council of Great Britain.

These Military Forces consist of the Permanent Force and the Active Militia.

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The Active Militia consists of all arms, as well as the usual administrative services, required to enable troops to keep the field. The term of service is for 3 years. The annual training is for not less than 12 or more than 30 days.

The peace establishment of the Active Militia is limited to 60,000, and the war establishment is about 150,000.

There is a Military College at Kingston, from which commissions can be obtained in the British Army, and officers of the Canadian Forces can go through the Staff College at Camberley.

The Active Militia is organized, trained, armed, and equipped similarly to the British army.

The divisions and brigades are similarly organized to corresponding formations of the British, except the Cavalry Brigade which consists of 3 regts. of Cavalry, 1 batt. Field Artillery, 1 field troops Engineers, 1 co. Army Service Corps, and 1 Field Ambulance.

The Active Militia of Eastern Canada is organized into:--

4 Cavalry Brigades.
6 Divisions.

These divisions are assigned to divisional areas. In Western Canada there are 3 Military Districts.

The strength of the Canadian Permanent Force at the outbreak of the war consisted of only 3,000 officers and men. The Active Militia had a nominal strength of under 50,000 officers and men, but in practice this force was considerably below its paper strength.

The Military forces of Canada were thus not only small in themselves, but also loosely organized, with an actual strength below the paper strength, and would require time for purposes of expansion and training.

Besides the Permanent Force and Active Militia there were also the following semi-military organizations in Canada:--

(1) The Royal North-West Mounted Police, a force of less than 1,000 men, trained as Cavalry, and used as a constabulary force in the west.

(2) Numerous Rifle Associations with about 25,000 members ready in an emergency to serve in the Militia.

(3) Cadet Corps with a total of about 20,000 cadets, divided into senior cadets (14 to 18 years), and junior cadets (12 to 14 years)

There was therefore, a considerable number of men and boys who were more or less familiar with the elements of military training, while the large numbers of the population accustomed to out-door and frontier life furnished abundant material for making good soldiers.

There was great enthusiasm in Canada for the war, and a large number of applications to enlist soon came in from all over the Dominion. It was at first intended to raise a First Contingent of 22,000 men, with another 10,000 for service in the Dominion, but this number was soon increased.

The First Canadian Contingent as finally formed was built up on the Small Permanent Force and the Militia, the permanent and militia units affording a foundation on which to build. Selections to fill those vacancies were made up from the large number of volunteers that applied to enlist from all parts and classes - miners, trappers, frontiersmen, townsmen, French Canadians, etc. Princess Patricia's own was formed as a crack regiment, chiefly composed of men who had served in the Regular Army, or seen service in the war in South Africa.

As the Permanent Force consisted of only 3,000, and the active Militia of about 40,000, while the Canadian Force was organized for a war strength of about 150,000 - 4 Cavalry Brigades, and 6 Divisions in Eastern Canada - it will be seen that many recruits had to be taken in to bring the units up to war strength. Unfortunately, the best material was not made use of for this purpose. The First Contingent contained a large proportion of townsmen, and about 1,500 French Canadians, and it contained a large number of men who seem to have been included only for political reasons, and who were not suitable for an expeditionary force.

The troops were assembled at a camp at Valcartier near Quebec. The original 22,000 grew until the strength of the First Contingent - including a regiment for Bermuda - was about 33,000. The equipment of the men was good, and the mounted men were supplied with good horses. A motor transport, ammunition train, and sanitary service was provided.

Troop ships (mostly Atlantic liners) were assembled in the St. Laurence, with an escort of war ships. At the end of September all was ready, and 31,250 men, 7,500 horses, and the complete equipment, in 32 transports, sailed for England.

The voyage across the Atlantic took 19 days. Great secrecy was maintained as to the port, and time of arrival, and the expedition was landed at Plymouth, taking train there to proceed to the camp at Salisbury Plain. Here, they went into 4 camps - one at Bustards, 2 at West Down, and one at Pond Farm.

It was decided by the War Office not to send a Canadian Division at once to the front, but to put the whole force through a course of training at Salisbury Plain. This seems to have been a great disappointment to many of the officers and men, who had expected to be sent to France soon after their arrival. As a matter of fact, the Canadian Force was not ready for service at the front, and would not be an efficient force for this purpose before it had some months training. Composed for the greater part of militia with little training, or of new recruits, it was not as efficient as the greater part of the Territorial Force of Great Britain; and only the best of the Territorial units have so far been sent to the front.

Lt. General E.A.H. Alderson of the British Army was placed in command of the Canadian Forces, soon after their arrival. On Nov. 3, they were inspected by the King, Lord Roberts, and Lord Kitchener.

It was at first intended that the men should remain for a short time under canvas, and then be transferred to huts before the winter came. The transfer to the huts was, however, delayed for some time owing to the difficulties in building them, and the majority of the troops remained under canvas until after Christmas. Some were still

under

under canvas on January 5th. These conditions have put the Canadians to a severe physical test. The Salisbury Plain camps were placed in exposed places. The rain began a few days after the arrival of the contingent, and has continued almost daily, while for the last ten days much of the country around Salisbury has been flooded. The men were for some time without boards in the tents, and slept on the wet ground. The roads were torn up by the heavy motor lorries, traction engines, etc., and the spaces around the tents became seas of mud.

The difficulties of the Canadians were increased by the isolation of the camps. The nearest villages were several miles away, and the nearest town - Salisbury - 12 to 16 miles. Owing to the short days, extremely bad weather, and necessity for constantly shifting and working on camps opportunities for training were very limited. The troops were thrown on their own resources for recreation. For any change the men had to motor or walk over miles of torn up muddy roads to Salisbury. Discipline became difficult, and there were many cases of overstaying leave drunkenness, or more serious offences, and 500 or more of the most undesirable men were sent back to Canada. There was a good deal of sickness - many cases of colds, grippe, rheumatism, and lumbago, etc. - and hospital at Fulford was filled. The houses being picketed out and continuously exposed to the weather, were much run down, and in poor condition.

While the First Contingent was in training at Salisbury Plain, a Second and Third Contingent were being raised in Canada. The Second Contingent which is now understood to be ready to embark was to consist of 17,000 men.

A statement published by the Colonial Office, Dec. 14, shows that Canada had then despatched on active service nearly 33,000 men, that she had on garrison duty within her borders 5,000 men, that 50,000 were under training in Canada, and that as soon as the Second Contingent was despatched, a further enlistment of 17,000 men was to be made to take its place.

On Dec. 27, the Canadian Minister of Militia announced that of the 6 surplus battalions of the Contingent at Salisbury Plain, 4 Infantry battalions could be used to provide infantry reinforcements instead of forming one of the brigades of the Second Contingent as originally intended. One regiment of Mounted Troops would supply Cavalry reinforcements, and Princess Patricia's Light Infantry would form part of Lord Kitchener's Army. This means that 4 more Infantry battalions for the Second Contingent will be raised in Canada.

On January 4 and 5, when the Canadian Camps were visited, owing to the prevailing floods, everything was seen under the worst conditions. At that time, the forces were disposed as follows:--

1st Brigade at Bustards.
2nd and 3rd Brigades at Lark Hill.
4th Brigade at String Plantation.

Artillery and Cavalry had just moved out of camp at Test Down to go into billets in nearby towns and villages.

In the camp at Bustards, the huts were about half-up, and half of the men still under canvas, waiting the completion of their huts. Headquarters had recently been moved from tents there, to the large stone Liston house, at Shrewton.

At Lark Hill, the 2nd and 3rd Brigades were all in huts. In this vicinity, much work had been done not only in building the huts for Canadians, but also in building many other huts (not yet occupied) for other troops, repairing roads, and building railroads. The roads were much torn up and in a very bad condition, blocked with traffic, and with numerous traction engines and trains used for the work of building camps, moving workmen, and repairing roads. The ground was torn up around the camps, and everything was a confusion of mud, water, wood and iron building materials, and traffic.

In attempting to get through from Lark Hill to String Plantation the country was found to be so flooded that it was not possible to get through by automobile, and the camps of the 4th Brigade were not visited.

At West Down all the troops except a brigade of artillery had recently left the camp to go into billets, and the ground and roads were flooded or in very bad condition.

The men and horses seen seemed to be considerably run down, as stated above, but many of the men were of excellent physical type and seemed none the worse for the adverse conditions. Some of the officers stated that since the men had been in huts, there was more sickness, than when they were in tents, and attributed this condition to the close quarters, after they had been accustomed to fresh air in the tents. They also stated that it was becoming impossible to get any condition for their horses, and that their motor transport had suffered much owing to the bad condition of roads.

Since the men went into camp at Salisbury Plain, they have followed the syllabus of training for the New Armies, as laid down in Army Orders, but the conditions have very materially interferred with all their drill and training. A considerable number of men had not yet completed the musketry course, and were waiting for favorable conditions to use the ranges.

Conditions have lately been unfavorable for all drill, and on the 4th and 5th inst., none were seen, other than a battalion attempting some company and extended order drill.

On the 5th Jan., the undersigned witnessed artillery training on the artillery range about 2 miles from Bustards. The practice was scheduled to be carried out by the 3rd, 31st, and 146th Artillery Brigades of the 28th Division of the New Armies. Part of the artillery in camp at Bulford. They used guns and ammunition belonging to one of the Canadian batteries, as they were not able to get their own on account of conditions or the roads. Only two guns were used in the firing. The General Officer Commanding the Southern Command, and other high ranking officers were present, and the Canadian officers were many of them assisted on the range or observing. There were 6 aeroplanes

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used in connection with the firing, the location of the targets and observation of firing being done by the aeroplanes, the targets not being visible from the guns, or from any observation station in their vicinity. This firing and the signals used was of a confidential character. One or more of the aeroplanes was in flight during the continuation of the practice.

The schedule for the firing was about as follows:--

1. Deliberate fire.

   a. Locating targets on map by messages dropped from aeroplane.
      Aeroplane to observe fire and signal results by Very signals.
   b. Locating targets from line and vertical angle or aeroplanes flying over.
      Targets to be signalled and results of fire given by flash lamp from aeroplane.

2. Rapid fire without previous ranging.

3. Firing (for effect) with own infantry near hostile target.

Targets to be located and results signalled by means of aeroplanes in the last two cases as under 1.

This practice promised to be very interesting, but was stopped at 12.30 owing to rain and thick weather, and postponed indefinitely, and it was said that when continued another range would be used. Only the first class of fire was, therefore observed, which was at ranges from about 2,500 to 4,000 yards. There was a wind of force about 4, blowing diagonally across the range. The aeroplanes were very skilfully handled, and the firing as signalled said to be good.

One of the Canadian regiments - the Princess Patricia's Own - has gone to the front as part of a division recently sent over to reinforce the British force in France. It is not known when it is intended to send the first Canadian Division to the front, but owing to conditions as stated above and the difficulties of training, it is doubtful if the Canadian troops on Salisbury Plain are in any better, if as good shape for service than when as first landed, and it is probable that it will take several months of training under more favorable weather conditions before they will constitute an efficient force for service at the front.

H. Drummond

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Need not be returned.

NAVY DEPARTMENT NHL
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

January 12, 1915.

From: Lieutenant G. Whitlock, U.S.N.,
To: Director of Naval Intelligence.

SUBJECT: The Argentine Navy.

The following remarks about the Argentine Navy are based on information obtained during my assignment as Naval Attaché at Buenos Aires, from April 1913 to November, 1914.

The subjects briefly treated are:

Administration,
Personnel,
Promotion,
Naval Schools,
Materiel,
Dockyards and Naval Stations,
Coast Defense,
Argentine views on our Navy,
Political conditions in South America,
Suggestions.

Administration.

The Argentine Navy put into effect a new and complete reorganization of their Navy Department the beginning of 1913.

This organization scheme is covered by report B No.4, 1913; it is in efficient operation and is considered very satisfactory.

The Minister of Marine may be a civilian or naval officer, and it is fortunate for the Argentine Navy that Rear-Admiral J.P.Sáenz - Valiente has held the portfolio for several years, and that his immediate predecessors were naval men. It is customary for a naval officer to be made Minister of Marine, and it is generally conceded by the government and politicians that the post requires more technical knowledge for efficient administration than a civilian may have. It also has the great advantage that the Minister has a more permanent place in the world than a politician and is both accountable to his administration

and to the Navy, as he returns to his regular rank after serving as Minister of Marine.

Appointments, contracts for materiel and everything connected with the position is done for the enduring good of the Navy, rather than for the period of one political party's period of control.

Due to the Minister being a naval officer, the navy takes little part in politics and for this reason is much more useful in times of political stress, and has had great influence in preventing, in the Argentine, the revolutions that are customary in most South American countries.

The Army and Navy are kept distinct; Army and Navy officers do not associate often together and are often unknown to each other. I believe that this is encouraged by the Government in order that they can be more dependable in times of political disturbance.

Due to Rear Admiral Valiente's endeavors, the Argentine Modern Navy now consists of the two dreadnoughts built here and four destroyers built in Germany, and is generally rounded out with the necessary drydocks and auxiliaries.

The valuable increases in the ships of the navy has been used to work up the zeal and efficiency of both officers and men and I consider that as a result the Argentine Navy is,for its size, as efficient as is possible, considering the quality of the Argentine people.

They are not as adaptable, practical, nor have the mechanical ability of our officers and men, and they are handicapped by obtaining about one half the enlisted force by conscription.

Personnel.

The officers compare well with those of the most efficient navies, are all well educated, cultivated, intelligent, fine looking and zealous. Sons of the oldest and best families go into the navy and social standing aids an applicant for the naval school. I saw no exceptions to the rule that all officers are of the white race.

About one-half of the enlisted force are volunteers and are well paid, efficient sailors. They fill the positions of artificers, engineers, petty officers, gunner's mates, gun pointers, etc. The conscripts are mostly ordinary seamen and coal passers. They serve for two years. Those that do well usually volunteer for longer service. Conscription is believed to be excellent for the country, but bad for the navy.

As the conscripts are selected from all parts of the

country and as there is little population along the coasts, most of the boys are from the interior. There being no factories, few of the population have any mechanical knowledge. The training of these country boys and returning them to their homes, is considered of great value and they can also be called on for service in time of war.

Argentina has practically no sea-going population or fishing fleet to draw from, and the country boy does not make a first class sailor. The exterior signs of discipline are cultivated. The men march well, are respectful and salute with precision. Their uniforms, although of cheap material, are neat and well cared for.

A complete list of the grades of officers, petty officers and enlisted men as allowed by law, is given on page 33, Memoria del Ministerio de Marina, 1912 - 1913, in the Office files. There is good movement in the official grades, the retirement for all kinds of physical disability being actively carried out.

A bill is now before Congress to regulate promotion; as recommended, it regulates promotion; one-third by selection, one-third by examination and official record after a certain length of service in the grade and one-third by seniority.

Naval Schools.

The course of study at the Naval Academy and the Naval Preparatory School is given in Register No. 1295. The Naval School for midshipmen is very efficient but the class of candidates is reported to be inferior. Of those 155, who applied in 1912, many of whom had been prepared in the preparatory school, 116 passed the medical examination, and 36 passed the medical and mental examination and were accepted. Those accepted were classed as;one, very good, 14 good and 21 ordinary.

There is also a school of application for lieutenants at which they are given courses in ordnance and ballistics for 4 1/2 months.

The Navy also has a school for pilots, there being 37 in training and 6 graduates in 1912. These pilots are for the entrance to the River Plate and for the interior rivers. The enlisted men have schools in all the principal branches of the Navy. Seamen's class, mechanics, electricians, signalmen, gunners, gun-pointers, torpedo-mines, radio-telegraphy, firemen and schools of regular primary education, for those conscripts who need it.

The officers are employed practically the same as ours, that is, the corresponding ranks are given the corresponding duties. There is some talk of making lieutenant-commanders watch officers, of the new battleships.

Materiel.

The latest list of vessels is given in Register No. 4744. Coal and fuel consumption tables may be found in"Memoria del Ministero de Marina 1913 - 1914, also a complete list of marine dependencies and their value.

The vessels that I saw in the Argentine Navy causes me to believe that they are in an excellent state of preservation for their age. Both hulls and machinery seemed to be in excellent condition. Practically all the batteries of vessels have been recently tried on the proving range, sights adjusted and powder charges determined.

The following material was being constructed in Europe at the beginning of the European War and was taken over by the country in which they were building.

4 destroyers about 1000 tons, Germany;
4 " " " " France;
2 aeroplanes, England;
torpedoes from Austria.

The large dry-dock at Puerto Militar is expected to be completed by July 1, 1915.

Oil storage tanks have been installed at Buenos Aires, Rio Santiago and Puerto Militar, and two vessels have been taken over from the Public Works Department to carry oil from Comodoro Rivadavia, to these tanks. Vessels are being converted into oil burning. The Argentine Republic may now be considered self-sustaining as regards fuel for its Navy, or it will be as soon as all the vessels are supplied with oil burners and storage tanks.

Endeavors are being made to make the country independent in regard to war supplies in case the supply from the exterior is cut off. It is understood that some medium sized projectiles have recently been made at the Arsenal at Rio Santiago.

As the Government is very short of funds at present, it is not probable that there will be any additions of importance to the Navy for two years or more and it is improbable that the orders cancelled in Europe will be refilled.

Coast Defenses.

The coast defenses are under the Navy and are as described in Register No. 1066.

The only coast batteries are near Puerto Militar and although in a good state of preservation, are out of date and would be of little value against a vessel with modern 12" guns.

Mines would be used to a great extent by the Argentines in protecting all their ports and they are exercising frequently with this means of defense.

Views of Argentine Officers.

All the Argentine officers who expressed an opinion in regard to the merits of the various navies, stated that, ship for ship, ours is the best both in materiel and personnel.

They say that we work harder, more hours each day and more days a year than any other navy, and that our mechanical ability is better. They think our discipline is good, but could be improved.

They study our service publications carefully and are copying our navy closer than any other, and probably will continue to do so.

They realize the assistance our Navy Department has given them and their appreciation is often expressed. The Minister of Marine called public attention to it in his 1913 report to Congress.

Political Conditions in South America.

At present the relations between Argentina, Brazil and Chile are excellent and there is considerable talk among the public men and in the Congresses of these countries to come to an agreement in regard to reduction of armament.

The borrowing powers of all these countries being reduced and the particularly bad financial conditions caused by the European War, prevent any increase of armament at present.

Due to their extremely bad financial difficulties, their government officials and their press is more favorable to us than it has ever been, and they are looking to the United States and to American financeers to lend them money and to assist in their development.

G W Whitlock

January 12, 1915.

To; Director of Naval Intelligence.
From; Lieutenant G.Whitlock, U.S.N.

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Notes

En Route Buenos Aires to New York.

I left Buenos Aires November 20, 1914, under orders to proceed to Washington, on the Holland Loyd "Frisia" with passengers for Lisbon, Vigo, an English port, and Amsterdam, and fresh meat and grain for Holland. The principal passengers were M. Garciamansilla, Minister from Argentina to the Pope. Sr. Guesalaga, secretary of legation to Argentina Legation at Copenhagen; Col. Reybauth, Argentine Military Attaché to Washington; a few Argentines for Lisbon, two German women for Amsterdam, a Belgian for the war and two Spanish mine owners from Chile.

There was expectation of news of a naval battle near the Straights about this time, and the Germans in Buenos Aires said the Falklands would be taken by December 1st. There being little chance of getting any valuable information it was not considered necessary to remain longer for that purpose.

There were no men of war in sight off Buenos Aires on our departure although one Argentine vessel has been on patrol in the Delta during the war. At Montevideo the 21st, there were no war vessels but near Labos Island we passed the Uruguayan cruiser standing in. At Santos a destroyer lay alongside the seawall and I was told she did patrol duty off Santos. We took on 27,000 bags of coffee here. There were no patrol vessels in sight off Rio, the Minos Geares and several others were anchored in the harbor. Major J. J. Dickinson of the State Department joined the vessel here on his way to Washington.

Two Germans, second class, travelling under false Chilian passports were required to obtain German passports before being allowed to continue on the vessel.

From Rio Janeiro to Lisbon no wireless news was received except an exchange with the Zealandia of the same line. The wireless was closed to avoid difficulties in case of search by war vessels and to avoid discussions between the passengers of

different nationalities. We passed close to Westward of Grand Canary and saw Los Palmas. Off Lisbon a British cruiser, three funnels about 14,000 tons was patrolling just outside the three mile limit. Her search lights were the first lights seen in approaching. She stopped us by signal, came within search light visibility and then within hail, and after the usual questions, allowed us to proceed.

Lisbon.

We are unable to land at Lisbon on account of a heavy storm. We had heard at Rio that Portugal had declared war, but we found that Portugal had just sent about 8000 troops to her African colonies for their protection. No other men of war in port except a few small Portuguese. The two Germans were sent ashore at Lisbon by orders of the commanding officer.

We called at Vigo, December 12th. We noticed several new buildings going up and signs of some commercial activity and prosperity. There were five or six German merchant vessels at anchor here, but no men of war.

From Finisterre we headed direct for the English Channel, although the Captain preferred to keep farther away from the French coast. He did not wish to meet any French men of war on account of the possibility of being sent into a French Port. He stated that the French men of war took a long time to make a boarding call and that after being passed it was necessary to be passed from one French vessel to the next along the coast. He said that one Holland Loyd vessel had been detained in Brest for about five days while her papers were referred to the government.

Early in the morning of December 14th the light on Land's End was sighted. At 8:30 A.M. a small old cruiser of about 1800 tons came within hail. After requiring our port of departure, captain's name, etc. and upon learning that our destination was Tilbury Docks, we were directed to pick up a pilot off the Isle of Wight.

There appeared to be a line of vessels on patrol between Land's End and Brest at about two miles distance between vessels. Two cruisers of the county class were in sight one about two miles to the northward and the other three or four miles to southward. Smoke could be seen both to northward and southward of these,indicating a complete line across the channel.

During the 14th we stood along the English coast passing the head lands at a distance of a mile or two.

The Captain said that no lights or land-marks had been changed from the Isle of Wight westward, but that eastward of this there were many changes including the location of light vessels, the characteristcs of lights, that many of the lights were not in use, and that the usual lights in farm houses and in villages were not in use.

Much merchant traffic was seen all day, as many as eighteen tramp vessels being in sight at one time. Two destroyers only were passed during the day, standing to the westward.

At Weymouth two search lights could be seen constantly in use, and two search lights and the reflection of the lights of Southampton could be seen to the northward of the Isle of Wight.

At about 9:30 P.M. the 14th we anchored to the eastward of the Isle of Wight near the channel, and passed several vessels at anchor, and anchored among about sixteen other vessels. Until half an hour after anchoring we were not apparently observed by a patrol or pilot boat; at this time a launch hailed inquiring the name of vessel and destination.

The lights of Southampton showed up bright. Six searchlights were constantly searching the harbor entrance and the vessels in the anchorage occasionally, but the field illuminated was between the forts and between our anchorage and the two forts.

Looking toward the entrance light there were two searchlights to the left and four to the right, probably one to the left was on the Isle of Wight and the two fartherest to the

right were on shore near or at Portsmouth. The others being on the two circular forts guarding the channel.

The use of the searchlights was too active to be efficient, flashing from one side to the other rapidly and then across the sky. Rays frequently crossing and interfering. The search-lights seemed very powerful, but the operators seemed badly trained.

The patrol here seemed very lax; it is thought that a submarine would have a fair chance to enter the harbor, and that it would be possible to get well between the forts with a merchant vessel intent on obstructing the channel.

We remained at anchor until 11 A.M. the 15th flying the pilot signal and the ship's number. A pilot then came on board and took us to an anchorage near Deal. He said he could not take us farther on account of danger of mines. We anchored here about 9:45 P.M.

From Deal a second pilot took us to London. A pilot flag was flown below the national flag to keep boarding officers away.

We were underway about 5:30 A.M. the 16th and proceeded up the Thames anchoring off the entrance to Tilbury Docks in the Thames about 10 A.M. The company's tender came alongside and the custom and immigration officials.

The officials took their place in the smoking room and each passenger passed alone in front of three officials and the ship's purser. The passengers intending to land were very carefully questioned, the letters of some were read and in other cases the baggage was searched.

Upon examining the passport, and enquiring the cause for the visit and business, the address of destination in England was taken, and the request for any letters was made. Anyone having sealed letters for mailing was most carefully questioned, and all letters of this kind were opened and read.

An American from Texas, educated in Germany and with a marked German appearance and accent, and with a passport nearly

two years old had to show all his private papers and baggage although he was not landing in London but was going to Amsterdam. He would have been unable to land with this passport.

A comparison of passports here showed the great superiority of the Argentine passport over ours. In shape it is a vest pocket leather folder. The descriptive list has a thumb print, a photograph with the passport number punched through, and sufficient accurate personal description that the passport cannot be doubted either as to the owner or as to the authenticity. If our passports are to be improved, the Argentine type should be examined, as it has many advantages over ours.

About twenty passengers landed, two hours and a half being required for the examination. Among these were J. J. Dickinson. Special commissioner of the San Francisco Exposition, and Col. Reyband, Argentine Military Attaché to Washington.

Upon entering the mouth of the Thames a squadron of British vessels were standing out; first came six torpedo boats in line, distance 400 or 500 yards, about 1200 yards behind came two scouts in column distance about 800 yards, then came a column of battleships, distance more than 400 yards, I should say nearer 600 yards. These vessels were about a mile and 1/2 or two miles from me and there was some fog. I counted eight, but others said there were eleven. Behind the battleships followed about 8 steam fishing smacks or small steamers. I believe these steamers were a part of a rear guard and for observation purposes and possibly to pick up men from the water in case of accident. Their position in the rear of the formation was similar to the torpedo boats ahead.

Just below Tilbury Docks a pontoon bridge across the Thames was opened for vessels to pass. This bridge led to the military reservation on the north side of the River, and troops may have been disembarked here; or as likely there were troops here who were marched across for railroad transportation

to a south coast port.

From Tilbury to London we passed a large training camp of soldiers, awkward squads and companies in various uniforms and civilian clothes, were being drilled and many rifles were firing on the rifle range. Many temporary barracks were also seen. The number of men in training here could not be easily guessed at but I should say there were at least 5000.

Upon arriving at Brown's Hotel in London the landlord laughingly met Major Dickinson and myself and informed us that the German's were bombarding the east coast at Scarborough, the actions of the people about the hotel and on the streets indicated no unusual excitement on account of this bombardment.

We visited Cook's and engaged tickets on the first steamer they could recommend sailing for the States December 26th, the Franconia of the Cunard Line. My original intention had been to go to Amsterdam and then to New York by the Holland-American line, thus travelling entirely by neutral vessels, but on arrival at Tilbury we found the Holland American Line had changed its European port from Rotterdam to Genoa, so it became necessary to disembark in England.

London at night looked very dreary on account of about half the street lights not being lighted, and the upper parts of those lighted being painted black and most of the shop windows being dimly lighted. All means of transportation seemed regular. There were many men in uniform on the streets, but few ambulances. Most of the public buildings and vehicles had recruiting signs, and many shop windows had military equipment or articles displayed.

The traffic seemed more active, the streets seemed filled with more prosperous people, and the general appearance of London was gayer, except for the gloomy appearance of the street lights, and more prosperous looking than when I visited it in February 1909. A trip through Soho, East Side and Hyde Park

and to some of the theatres confirmed this opinion. During my stay in London I only heard Tipperary once, and that at the Carleton; no one sang or joined in the chorus, nor was there any applause.

The absence of martial music, patriotic songs and war spirit in the people is remarkable, and particularly noticable. Even in as distant a place as Buenos Aires one hears more patriotic music than in England, and considerable more tales of German atrocities.

Many of the dancing clubs were in full swing till early hours of the morning but no alcoholic drinks were served except to guests in hotels after ten P.M. Half or more of the men at these places were in service uniform, and the Canadians were well represented and were popular, no doubt for the plentiful supply of money they distributed. I talked with one Canadian and he said many of his pals were Yanks and had seen service in Cuba, the Plilippines and other parts of the world. An Englishman of high standing who has been at the front two months with the Red Cross told me that the Canadians are a terrible drunken, undisciplined lot and that Kitchener has been afraid to send them to the front for fear of the bad disciplinary effect on the regular troops. Their fighting qualities have not been questioned and it is thought that they may be good fighters. Part of the first contingent,about 5000, went through Abbeyville, France, December 23rd for the front, so it is likely that the whole of the first contingent are now at the front. An officer told me that new troops were not sent to the trenches at once, but were held to the rear within sound of the guns for a few days to let their nerves steady. This is being done now but could not be done at first on account of the immediate need of the men on the firing line.

Having a few days before our boat left and after consulting the Ambassador in London, Major Dickinson and I left for

Paris, Sunday the 20th. Our passports were visèd at the French Consulate General, Saturday.

After being inspected at the station by Scotland Yard officials we left at 8:30 A.M. and arrived at Folkstone about 10 A.M. I saw Lord Kitchener in a worn, muddy overcoat just after he had landed on his return from the front. Two very smart and fine looking officers met him and he sent them back to his boat on some duty. He then continued up the platform to his car alone and unguarded.

We left Folkstone for Boulogne and arrived about 1 P.M. Few civilians were travelling, mostly Red Cross officials and nurses, a few army officers, mostly of the Army service corps.

A fine large capable woman had an audience of several men around her as she told about the fighting around Arras. She had been to the front several times and under fire. She was dressed the part. Small hat, heavy winter burberry, short skirt and heavy shoes, and carried her own handbag and medical case. An officer who had been talking to her thought she was Lady Hemstead. I was told that the British wounded are sent to Bolougne; the Belgians send theirs to Calais and some of the Northern French troops are sent to Dunkirk.

Off Bolougne was a small Red Cross yaght. In the harbor was a large Red Cross vessel alongside the dock, another smaller Red Cross vessel, several vessels unloading stores and the docks were covered with ambulances; I counted more than eighty. Besides there were many London busses near the railway station. There were many doctors, nurses and soldiers on the dock, many looking for the English papers, I think. I gave mine to a chauffer, he showed it to an officer in the car and both thanked me very cordially. As though it was really a treat to get a paper. In talking with some of the officers they said it is almost impossible to get a paper near the front.

The country through which we went in France was still

quite green, turnips and cabbages still in the gardens, but few people were seen in the fields or about the farm houses. No lights were seen in the farm houses and few in the villages we passed. The railroad was carefully patrolled by French sentries at short distances. Trains on the sidings consisted of covered military goods cars or open cars of turnips and apples and fuel.

At Abbeyville there were several military trains, evidently a military base, quite a number of British troops were apparently living in railway cars. A French Red Cross nurse told us that 1300 wounded had gone through there that day, six train loads, two British and five French.

We arrived at Paris about 9:30 P.M. and had considerable difficulty in getting a taxi. The city seemed almost entirely deserted and very dark. At the Continental Hotel we were told we could have any accomodation we wanted at our own price. There were not 40 guests in the hotel, although at the beginning of the war there were more than 600 Americans there. A police pass was not now necessary but all cafés closed at 10 P.M. and all the lights were turned out at midnight. After this hour the city was patrolled with aeroplanes with searchlights. Although I saw none of these. No aereal patrol was seen while in London and no guns were visible from the streets.

France appeared very much at war; most of the motor cars were military and Red Cross and always in rapid motion. Numerous buildings flew the red cross and many others were red cross workshops. Many of the civilian men seen were foreign. All Frenchmen were at the front, 4,500,000; and 3,000,000 more under training, so I was told by the Editor of the N. Y. Herald, Paris Edition. Theatres closed, actors at the front, actresses in the Red cross; the expensive cafés closed, all at the front and no patrons to serve. All the women; women out of work and all the demimonde, are employed by the government making uniforms, knitting socks or making bandages and nursing.

England seems to be taking the war as a sporting proposition and not really in it strong, but France seems to be intensely patriotic and in the war as a whole compact nation with one end in view. The administration of the British is outspoken everywhere, as well as shown by French, Belgian and British flags always together on buildings. There is big propaganda for Belgian relief although there is much distress in many parts of France. I saw no one at the Embassy when I called and I was not at the Hotel when Lieutenant Commander Bricker called.

I tried nowhere to get any official information and travelled as a tourist.

We passed Vincenes and noticed the military activity there; saw some cattle still kept at Long Champs and also some of the barricades near this gate to Paris. Numerous roads were marked for military use only.

Our automobile had to have a special pass to go beyond the gates of Paris, but travelling in the train to Versailles in a train with a guide we needed no passes.

At Versailles we stopped for lunch at a small café with several military motor cars in front and found the café well filled with military officers. A Colonel asked us to take a table some distance from where he was dining with two other colonels and after his lunch he came and asked us our business and then asked us about American sentiment in regard to the war and seemed very friendly himself to us. Later a waiter told us that about a dozen young officers in noisy conversation at the other end of the room were all aviators just from the front and that they were telling how many Germans each had killed with bombs.

While walking through the deserted grounds at Versailles we heard in the fog and rain the exhaust of an aeroplane and immediately after rifle fire and an automatic gun. The fire was kept up for about two minutes. As it was too foggy for any kind of target practice, I considered that the firing was at the aeroplane.

Upon leaving the grounds an old woman with a baby carriage asked us our business, and answering that we were looking for the station, she said "There, there is the station", in a very firm and determined way, and then watched to see if we carried out her orders. Every person in France seems to take a personal interest in the war, quite different from the attitude of the English.

The British sargeant on guard at the Trianon Hotel,now a hospital,said there were about 450 wounded there, mostly British, but some Germans. We met another sargeant on our way to the station who had been in the retreat from Mons and was afterward wounded in a cavalry charge on the trenches near Arras. He had cleared the first trench and was about half way from the second when something knocked him off his horse. He woke up in a field hospital with a bullet hole through his lung and out of his shoulder blade. He said it was a dumdum. I told him that high velocity bullets did that at short range, but he was of the firm belief that the German bullets were all dum dum. There seems little doubt that many of them are so made by the soldiers of both sides.

On the return to London an English reporter told me there was the best evidence that the Germans had issued orders that no more prisoners are to be taken.

An English gentlemen told me that about August 4th the German aviators fired the hangars at Buc,(this name I am nott sure of) and destroyed 70 or 80 military planes. A young British scapegoat friend of his, a reckless aviator in the French service had told him this. This aviator had received 10,000 francs for one flight for the French government. This man also told me that there had been unusual corruption in the French purchasing department and that much ammunition and material at the beginning was of inferior quality, but that now patriotism had risen to such a pitch that graft at present is more

dangerous, but that there is still considerable corruption.

I was shown a flechette or arrow used by the French aeroplanes and also the Germans use something similar, a very sharp pointed projectile the size of a rifle projectile with a grooved out tail, total length about 4 1/2 inches. (Clipping attached.) These are dropped by hundreds from an aeroplane on uncovered trenches and men in the open and are doing much damage. Ten to twenty million are being made in England for the French; information received from two reliable sources.

On our return through Abbeyville, some soldiers there said 5000 Canadians had gone through there the 23rd December. There were about thirty wounded French African wounded on the platform; several British wounded boarded the train here. Like the Africans,many were wounded in the left hand, so wounded by grasping the enemies bayonet with the left hand, in hand to hand fighting.

There was a report about that the Germans were holding their left hands above the trenches in order that they might be wounded and sent to the hospital. I asked if there was any possibility of the British wounds being caused in this way and it was indignantly denied, of course.

Of the wounded and sick, I actually saw, I should judge that one half had their left hand in a sling.

We lost at Abbeyville a Red Cross hospital sargeant, seventy-two years old. With 40 years service in the British Army and retired. At the outbreak of war he had tried to enter the British Red Cross for active service but being refused, he had joined the French Red Cross. He wept in telling of the sights he had seen at the front and was a little unbalanced as a result. While talking to some wounded at Abbeyville, he lost the train and came near falling under it in doing so. He also lost part of his kit left in our compartment and a chance to have Christmas dinner with his family.

The saddest sight near the front is that of the female

Red Cross nurses who look overworked. Cold and half fed and old with mental suffering. They suffer more, I think, than the wounded themselves. A soldier get hit, dies or goes to a hospital and gets over it without any special worry. But the constant sight of mangled flesh and blood every day, must be terrible for these nurses.

On the boat from Bolougne, there were about twenty slightly wounded or sick officers, eighty or a hundred men, eight or ten female nurses, fifty or sixty Belgian refugees, and forty or more civilians, business men returning to England for Christmas.

All the men I talked to seemed anxious to get back to the front after their holidays. There seemed to be no special bitterness with the Tommies against the Germans, and no talk about atrocities. They all praised their commissary and said they were being fed well now, but that they had difficulties sometimes during the active movements of the early campaign.

In London, I was told by one of our officers that they were not getting much information, due to the fact principally that the report of the sinking of the Audacious was printed in American papers and that it was reported that this news was verified by our State Department, thus placing our Embassy in London under suspicion. The publishing of anything given by officers abroad should absolutely be prohibited. Everything should be considered as confidential.

Four Americans with commissions in the British Army called on one of our officers in one day. Newspaper men also drop in and American business men, in London. These are the kind of men from whom real information is obtained, and it is desirable that our officers make their headquarters attractive to such people; to do so costs money. The importance of obtaining information now is of the greatest importance and I consider that our officers should all be given a liberal enter-

tainment allowance for this purpose. I have no desire to benefit by such an allowance nor has any one asked me to make this recommendation, but justice requires such an allowance for assistant attachès.

The best armies and navies of the world are now using the latest and best military methods and material and present emergencies are bringing out new devices. Unless we are informed of these at once, we become every day more antiquated and less efficient in comparison with our possible enemies.

England's commerce at sea is booming at present. She helps this by delaying neutral vessels, competitors, by causing unnecessary delays.

All vessels entering the English Channel must go up the Thames to Tilbury Docks. Passengers and cargo have to be carefully inspected and plenty of time is taken for this examination. Not having been in the active part of the world long enough to know what has been done with American vessels, but I imagine our vessels are treated the same as the Dutch. The Captain of the"Fusia" was outspoken in his disgust at the delay and believed the British had a regular system of treatment of neutrals to delay their vessels and thus cut down their profits, the advantage being always for British shipping.

So far the war has cleaned the population of the gay youth, the London "Nut" and Johnny, and the unemployed and the praise is general for the way these have gallantly gone to the front and have fought bravely and many have died bravely. It is said that about 30,000 British troops are being sent each week to the front and that there are now about 450,000 troops on the continent. In February it is expected that 1,500,000 will be at the front.

Herewith is a newspaper description of the appearance of the battlefield which a British Army officer told me is an accurate description.

The Scarborough raid has greatly increased enlistment. A man from Liverpool said 2400 men applied in one day for a bantam regiment, authorized to enlist men slightly below the regulation size.

Mr. Herbert Wright Kaufman, the American author, was present at the bombardment of Scarborough, where he has a cottage overlooking the sea. He said, many of the troops went to the trenches without arms. He left there for America due to the active campaign against spies, and due to the suspicion connected with his German name. The English papers reported that there was no panic, but he said that nearly every citizen in the locality left for the interior and that quite a number had not returned.

Travers Humphries, K.C. a well known British barrister, told me that two French Generals were shot after Mons. One had a German wife, and his case looked like he had sold out to the Germans. Also that since the war two British Colonels had been cashiered for cowardice. One, after, or at the battle of the Marne, had a comparatively small body of men with him, lay down their arms at the request of the mayor of a town that did not want his town destroyed on account of resistance by the British troops. The mayor said there was an overwhelming force of Germans approaching and that the men could hide in a wood near the town. The colonel carried out these suggestions and found that the overwhelming forces were British.

It is said in London that Kitchener and Churchill are completely running the British Government.

It is also said that the cause of the Bulwark explosion was most probably caused by a broken whip while handling ammunition. It seems that it would be better to hoist all ammunition by means of portable elevators of the belt system.

Ammunition lighters could be supplied with a permanent elevator such as is used in handling baggage from wharf to the Atlantic liners.

The people of Europe are changing their ideas from the possibility of disarmament and international peace, and the victorious nation will desire to obtain as great a reward for its sacrifices as is possible. Having the military power, the military outlook and the military authorities in control, desire to make the best use of the power while it is available, being also short of funds and having great sums due from Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and other South and Central American Republics, it is probable that their demands for a proper settlement of their claims will be forceful at least, and are likely to conflict with our practice.

The vast work of preparing the finances of the South American countries must be carried on by us as fast as possible in order that our interest do not conflict, with the European. Nothing but the most energetic action and thorough regulation of the finances of these countries immediately, can place us in a safe position.

Our activity in establishing a merchant marine and activity in the South American markets does not assist us in these negotiations, with an European power. Our possession of a strong fleet at the end of this European War is more necessary for the peace of our country than at any time in its recent history.

The newspaper campaign of Germany in the United States and elsewhere is no better managed than the British. The British are more clever, if anything, in cultivating the favor of the American people. A government, able to establish as vigorous a censorship as the British, can as equally well carry out a newspaper propaganda for our consumption. Our eyes must not be blinded to the detriment of our future commercial in-

terests.

The restraint placed in our officers in England in obtaining information looks very much like the British leaders look on us as a possible or probable enemy.

I have obtained a letter of introduction for L. B. McBride to Sir Gilbert Parker from H. W. Kaufman, who states that Sir Gilbert is probably the head of the newspaper campaign to gain the friendship of the American people and that he has aspirations to become British Ambassador at Washington. Sir Gilbert arranged an interview with the consent of Churchill for Kaufman to interview the son of Admiral Von Tirpitz, now in England a prisoner, but after all arrangements were made, Von Tirpitz would not be interviewed. Sir Gilbert Parker holds relations with the British government such that he can, if he wishes, be of much use to our officers. There is no doubt that there is an organized news campaign to influence the American public, and probably Sir Gilbert Parker is at its head.

In the west the Allies consider they are now slowly winning, if not having the largest number of men, they have a preponderance of artillery and a steady supply of material and ammunition.

Having been at sea the month previous to my trip to London and Paris, and having been out of touch with United States newspapers for nearly two years, I am submitting these notes with no idea of their being of any special value except that they may give a viewpoint different from that obtained by constant reading of the American papers.

Need not be returned.

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1900)

SUBJECT Conditions in Italy - January 1 - January 12, 1915.

From T No. 23. Date January 12, 1915.

Replying to O. N. I. No. ——— Date ———

1. Since the first of January I have heard so many predictions of war in Italy, that I deem the following information relative thereto, of special interest.

2. An American gentleman just arriving here from Milan, stated to me that the people of Northern Italy talk of nothing else but of war and the near return of Trentino and Triest to Italy. He said Milan was making every preparation, all hospitals were being fully equipped, trolley lines were being built between hospitals and the railroad station, and old trolley cars were being rigged for carrying wounded. Yesterday a member of the British Embassy staff, a man of wide experience, told me he was absolutely certain Italy was going to war. He confirmed the above report regarding preparations in Milan and added that all hospitals throughout Italy have received orders to prepare and that public schools have been notified to stand by for closing. I believe this expresses the opinion of the British Embassy, and that it means more than the mere statement implies. About the first of January when the question of England's interference with Italy's commerce was acute, Hon. Sonnino, Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated, unofficially and in private, that England was surely forcing Italy into the war. I know this to be a fact, but it must be treated as confidential. It impresses me that the above statement coming from the British Embassy indicates that they know Italy will enter the war because England so wills it - now that the annihilation of Germany appears to be a larger proposition than was anticipated.

3. A friend just arriving from Taranto informs me that the Italian Fleet was busily engaged in maneuvers and exercises. He stated that almost every night target practice was held - but rarely with heavy guns. Submarines and various divisions of the fleet went to sea daily for exercises, but I was surprised to learn that apparently not once during his sojourn in Taranto of 2 weeks, was the entire fleet out for maneuvers.

4. Today's papers announce the possibility of four more military classes being called to join the colors in the near future. This would bring the Army in the field above a million. Next year's class has already been called and has joined the colors.

(See-Paragraph 4. Instructions of October 31. 1900.) Need not be returned.

SUBJECT French battleship COURBET disabled by Austro-Hungarian submarine U XII. (Supplement to report G-21, of December 23, 1914) (4)

From G *No.* 1 *Date* January 12, 1915.

Replying to O. N. I. No. ..... *Date* .....

The following article appeared in the "Neue Freie Presse of the 11th instant:

HEROIC DEED OF OUR SUBMARINE U XII.

Details of the Sinking of the COURBET.

"We have learned the following details of the action between the Austro-Hungarian submarine U XII and the French fleet:
The French flagship COURBET was effectively hit by a torpedo from the submarine. It is said that the Dreadnought JEAN BART in attempting to take the damaged COURBET in tow rammed and sank the latter.
The French claim that it was the Jean Bart instead of the COURBET that was hit by a torpedo and that the JEAN BART was only slightly damaged, as the torpedo did not explode. The JEAN BART was taken to Malta and docked.
Lieutenant Lerch remained under water with his boat for 21 hours.
The French were steaming in double column, and therefore the U XII had to dive under the first column in order to reach the flagship."

A few days ago I was informed by the chief of the central office of the Navy Department at Vienna that the authorities are quite certain that the COURBET was sunk; that they have reliable information that she has not reached any port since she was torpedoed.

Stephen V. Graham

Need not be returned

(See-Paragraph 4. Instructions of October 31. 1900.)

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SUBJECT Denial of Losses in the Austro-Hungarian Fleet.

From G *No.* 2 *Date* January 14, 1915.

Replying to O. N. I. No. *Date*

The following article appears in the Vienna newspapers of this date:

With respect to the news spread by the foreign press as to the losses of the Austro-Hungarian fleet, the activities of the French fleet in the Adriatic, etc., the following facts are officially established:

"Since the sinking of the ZENTA on August 16th not one of our ships, boats, or air craft has been in any way injured by the fire of the enemy's or our own guns, although plenty of ammunition has been expended against them; not a single man of the fleet has even been wounded, while in the French fleet the submarine CURIE has been destroyed and a battleship of the COURBET class has been hit by two torpedoes, being thereby at least seriously damaged.

"Since November 3d, with the exception of submarines, not a single enemy ship has been seen on our coast.

(signed) Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet."

Stephen V. Graham

Italian Naval Officer.

Office of Naval Intelligence. (Translation).

"The Cause of the Increase in the Caliber and the New Fifteen-inch Gun of the Royal Italian Navy."

February 13, 1915.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. MEMORANDUM

January 19, 1915. FML

The accompanying article was written by an Italian Naval Officer - not for publication but for the official files - explaining the reasons why the Ordnance Board recommended the adoption of the 15" 40 gun for the new dreadnoughts.

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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

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THE CAUSE OF THE INCREASE IN THE CALIBER AND THE NEW FIFTEEN INCH GUN OF THE ROYAL ITALIAN NAVY.

Scientific progress is comparable x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x .

Naval Ordnance has returned to the great sizes that were in force 30 years or so ago, and if we examine the cause of this last increase of caliber, we can readily see, that the motive is the same now as in the past; that the desire is not only to damage the enemy's ships and put them out of action, but to do so with as few shots as possible. This is more easily obtained now than formerly since greater damage results from a single hit as the present projectile with its high velocity and greater weight carries a high modern explosive charge. Modern rifles of the same calibers are naturally xxx great deal more powerful than they were thirty years ago.

The invention of smokeless powder which occurred simultaneously with the adoption of the rapid fire gun, was the determining factor for the decrease in caliber of the 450 and the 431 mm to 343 and 254, respectively. Naval tacticians admit that there was a great possibility of defeating an enemy by a rain of small sized projectiles playing havoc with the crew, demolishing the super-structure, etc. At that time it seemed sufficient to have for the largest calibers 10" and 12". This opinion was well interpreted by Kipling in his "Ballad of the Champerdown", describing the great ship with her heavy and cumbersome 100 ton guns being easily vanquished by small cruisers equipped with light but more easily handled guns.

The rapid progress of armor and naval construction has made it necessary to increase the power of the main batteries and thus the 12" gun was generally selected. This perpetual desire for increase of power finally brought forth a gun of 50 calibers with a 400 kilos projectile and an initial velocity of 900 meters or more. No one can deny, and I less than others, as I have always been a strong partisan of the increased caliber, that the 12" gun of the latest type was not the most formidable weapon, All ordnance constructors must agree that this gun was obtained at a very dear price, that of the "life of accuracy" which has been successively reduced. It is superfluous to say that the chief object in the service of the gun is to fire as many times as possible with sufficient precision to guarantee an adequate percentage of useful hits, consequently no benefits result by installing guns that an hour 's firing suffices to put them out of commission. As it is impossible to increase the power of the 12" gun without shortening the life, already too short, and as modern fighting ranges are from 8 to 12 miles, and as the resistence and width of armor is increased it remains necessary for naval ordnance constructors to meet this ballistic progress by the one method available, that of increasing the caliber of the gun.

The English were the first to make a decision; in fact, the 12" caliber gun was only installed on 6 British dreadnoughts when they turned out a 13.5" firing projectiles weighing 567 kilos. This was immediately followed by another gun of the same caliber but heavier that fired a projectile of 635 kilos. Even this gun did not satisfy the British Admiralty and it was decided to arm the ships of the Queen Eliza-

beth and Royal Sovereign Classes with the 15" gun which is the size adopted by Italy, Japan and Germany for their latest superdreadnoughts.

At a meeting of ordnance experts in London, a constructor announced the existence of an 18" gun, but stated that it was only for experimental purposes. In the meantime, the United States following the others, armed her ships with a 14" and experimented with a 16". France had a 13.4" gun and was experimenting with a 14.5" and the 15". Krupp mentioned in one of their catalogues a 16" gun.

The increase in the caliber of naval guns and the definite abandonment of the 12" are two assured facts, and it should not be lamented, especially the first, because the life of the guns has been appreciably prolonged. The Italian Navy adopted for her new ships the 15" gun after profound study and not by merely following the example of others, as some are pleased to write. The directors of our naval ordnance commenced immediately by discarding any thought of adopting an extra large caliber of 45 or 50 calibers length with an initial velocity of 850 to 900 m.s. Such a gun I have always considered absurd and have diligently fought, but it has some worth, because such guns should not have a shorter life than the 12". Krupp have been obliged to admit that their 15" gun of high initial velocity would be less durable than their 12" and it is precisely this condition that would render it very foolish to adopt such a gun. If this is true, a matter which one is permitted to doubt, how were they able to fire as they state 200 rounds develpping an initial velocity of 900 m.s. to a 800 kilos projectile?

Pleasing or displeasing to the manufacturers of ordnance, it is certain that the life of a gun is proportional inversely to the square of the caliber, under the same ballistic conditions. We remember that the United States made a 5" wire wound gun that developed an initial velocity of 1036 m.s. and that 31 rounds were sufficient to put it out of commission. A 12" gun that has been fired under the same conditions, would not last more than 8 shots. Thus is seems evident that it would be a wicked speculation to build a ship of 30,000 tons or more and arm her with 15" or even 16" guns which would become useless after 50 shots at the most. This excessive and superfluous ballistic power would be certainly contrary to our definite object.

The relation between the erosion, caliber and the weight of the charge is illustrated in the following table, an extract from a table compiled from recent experimental data, it should be accepted with some reserve, however, as it is very general.

Calibers -	I.V. Approx m.s.	Approx. Life of Gun. Full charges No. rounds
9.2	840	450
9.2	885	300
12.	825	280
12.	900	160
13;5	760	450

Considering this data only for comparison as it is not absolutely correct, it is seen that a 1[illegible]" caliber gun with a charge of 140 kilos cordite I.V. of 900 m.s. has a life of about 160 rounds, that a 13.5" 45 caliber which fires the same quality of cordite but less, gives an initial velocity of 760m.s. and a life of 450 rounds, accordingly the 14" and the 15" 45 caliber developing I.V. of 760 m.s. should have a life of 420 and 350 rounds respectively

The influence of the initial velocity and of the weight of the charge to the life of the gun is evident.

The Italian Navy welcoming the idea of gaining by a deliberate increase of caliber, made a gun the power of which though relatively small for its caliber, was superior of many not only the 12" but also of those of larger calibers already in service in other navies. This gun gave a decided increase in the respective power of the projectile. It is thus seen that the increase of the caliber acts to lengthen rather than shorten the life of the gun and the efficiency of the projectile increases by natural consequences not only by its greater mass but also as it permits an explosive charge of enormous power. If we consider the ships actually afloat, fitting out or ordered, excepting the Pennsylvania and Nos. 39 and 40 of the United States Navy, we will find that they will have armor inferior to the 15" projectile. This is the condition we most desire, because a projectile which strikes an armor inferior to its caliber not only pierces it but entirely destroyes it. The violence of the blow annihalates the backing, pierces the armor and explodes in the interior with an effect more easily imagined than described. The explosive effect of the projectile which

depends on the projectile's capacity, and not on the velocity of striking, has therefore the same destructive effect at all ranges. On the other hand the penetration may be obtained in an inferior caliber of armor even with a projectile whose I.V. is not so high, and strictly speaking, it is not necessary to have armor piercing projectiles making it possible to adopt a projectile not unlike the semi-armor piercing projectile formerly used which would make it even more efficient. Until lately it was held as a fact that hardened armor had to be struck by projectiles of a caliber equal to the same thickness of the plate, or in other words, there was being advanced the idea of the use of equal calibers of armor and projectiles. However; since the use of armor was no longer a simple experimental question it became evident that insorder to get this necessary increase in the penetrating power of the projectiles, projectiles of equal caliber had to be used. As it was impossible to obtain of them a relati e high striking velocity, it was hardly possible to prevent their explosion at the instant of striking the armor, in which case the material behind the armor would suffer no damage. By increasing the caliber, and proportionally the weight of the projectile, the striking velocity required to pierce a plate of a certain thickness but smaller than the caliber of the projectile, is actually much reduced, so that the projectile might surely penetrate and explode within even though fired at a distance much greater than could be possible for equal caliber projectiles.

The experience acquired as to the effects of large projectiles on modern armor plate is just what has led to the adoption of super-calibers. Inasmuch as the weight of the exploding charge is approximately proportional to the total weight of the

projectile, about the cube of the caliber, all super-caliber projectiles have an enormous exploding and destroying effect.

The increase in the caliber permits also increasing proportionally the weight of the projectile, therefore obtaining greater penetration than would be the case with lighter projectiles at the same range. I might add that by adopting a projectile with a greater ogival radius than formerly used the air resistance being much reduced allows the projectile to strike the target with greater velocity and hence with much greater penetration. All these conditions favor a diminution of I.V. , that is, a reduction in the weight of charge which is the only condition apt to prolong the gun's life.

The problem as to which armament is to be adopted for our dreadnoughts, as it is presented to the directors of our naval ordnance, is as follows: knowing the quantities of the charges and the sizes of the principal foreign armaments, then the problem is to seek the most efficient destructive power, remembering that the chief facts of this efficiency are -

a) the volume of fire, or the number of rounds that can be fired in a certain time.

b) the power in the projectile after striking the armor.

c) the quantity of high explosive in the projectile.

d) the accuracy of fire

The volume of fire depends upon the number of guns on board, and many believe that it should not be less than ten. We know that there are ships armed with 12 - 13 or 14 - 15" guns; the British Admiralty has decided, however, that 8 - 15" guns are sufficient for their latest ships. It is said that Germany will carry 10 - 15" on their future ships and that the French super-dreadnought of the Duquesne type will carry 16 - 13.4" guns in 4 quadruple turrets. It is certain, however, that

we do not desire to have a greater tonnage than 30 or 32,000; it then becomes necessary to choose a large caliber and whether they should be in triple or quadruple turrets if the guns are to be more than 8. The question of turrets for 8 or more guns of super-caliber has been greatly discussed, and it is too long and difficult to be summed up here. The question of the sizes of the guns is an easier problem. When it was known that our Navy wished to adopt the 15" gun, and even before the characteristics of the gun were known, there took place in the newspapers an intense campaign against such a caliber and for the adoption of the 14" similar to those being built for Japan in England. Leaving aside the reasons for this campaign, we resume as follows the objections and criticisms which influenced the Ministero della Marina in its decision.

1° As a result of the adoption of the 15" gun an increase of displacement and a decrease in the number of guns became necessary; if a gun or turret became useless, the fighting power of the ship was proportionally decreased.

2° The displacement will be increased in virtue of the weight not only of the guns and the method of installation, but also of the projectiles and of the charges unless it is wished to decrease the number of rounds carried per gun.

3° The amount of armor on the turrets will necessarily be increased, the hull must be stronger and heavier to resist the force of explosion and consequently larger and more powerful engines must be installed to drive a ship of such tonnage at the required speed.

4° A large decrease in initial velocity, although decreasing erosion and the life of the gun, it will decrease the accuracy.

5° It is doubtful whether the charge of high explosive

which can be carried in a 15" shell, can be fired with security; there is also a fear that it will cause the shell to break up upon striking before the fuze functions.

6° The 14" projectile penetrates about 40 centimeters of armor at 10,000 meters, which is quite sufficient. On the other hand, in comparing the penetrating power of two guns, we should not compare their respective striking power, but should consider the projectiles in their separate parts. Consequently, in order to obtain the same penetrating power, with a large caliber projectile, it will not be possible to reduce the initial velocity, nor the striking power.

7° The inertia of the mass of charge and projectile being greater for the large calibers will increase the practical difficulty of rapid firing, and also make it necessary to adopt mechanical means for all loading, etc. It is not enough to consider the weight of steel that can be fired at each broadside, but, above all, the time in which it can be done, in order to suffocate the enemy at the very beginning of the action. The adoption of the 15" instead of the 14" should have as a result that of covering the enemy with steel and explosives as would be the case if 7 or 8" guns were employed.

8° The adoption of one projectile is an important reason to justify the increase of caliber, which is not possible until a fuze automatically adjustable is in service. I have already said that a large caliber projectile has a greater power as its explosive charge is heavier. In consequence it will be unwise to delay the adoption of a super-caliber gun but to immediately select the 15" which has all the attributes that are necessary for the near future.

The I2" projectile has a trajectory similar to that of the semi-armor piercing but not so flat. It is sufficient however to penetrate an equal thickness of armor. The high explosiv I2" shell with its thin walls is able to pierce 8/IO of a plate that is entirely pierced by a projectile of equal size. According to the Naval Annual of I9I2 the Vickers I5" projectile will penetrate 675 mm of hardened steel at 3000 meters , assuming therefore, that the efficiency of a I5" projectile of the semi-armor piercing type, so called Italian, is about 80 percent compared to the Vickers, and if provided with a cap, it may be safely said that it will easily pierce 400mm of K.C. armor with with but 340 m;s. of velocity. This power is more than sufficient attained as it is by increasing the charge by only I2 kilos.

Since our I5" gun is suited to conditions of moderatefire and therefore is expected to be expected to be used with relatively light charges, it is obvious that the strain on the hulls will not exceed that from a I2" gun. The objections, therefore, that the gun should require a greater resistence of construction are put aside at once with the other conditions that are dependent thereon.

The question of adopting with this I5" gun the secondary batteries of either 7.5 or 8" should not interfere with the acceptance of this gun, as this consideration would also be necessary if the I3.5 or I4" were adopted. In fact, in the "Rivista Nautica" No. I3-I4 of July, I9I2, there was proposed a ship armed with 8-I3.5" and I4-IO" guns xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and the Brazilian Admiral Bacellar, had proposed for the Rio de Janeiro (at present, SULTANO OSMAN), an armament of 8-16" and 8-10" guns. This question, however, has nothing to do with the increase in caliber.

The question of a vessel losing more or less of her fighting efficiency on account of a gun or turret being struck

by a lucky shot is no longer worth considering: it is a question of "do not put too many eggs in one basket", so frequently brought up against the adoption of double, triple, or quadruple turrets This objection has never prevented them from being accepted, however.

It is believed that greater thought should be given, instead, to the question of a single kind of projectile which last has so far failed owing to the lack of a proper fuze. It seems, indeed, worthwhile to show the advantages, evident as they may already be, of single projectiles; as regards the fuze, unfortunately, none have been found as yet, automatically adjustable according to the strength of the target, but it is sincerely hoped that this problem will soon be solved. Meanwhile fuzes rapidly adjustable according to the target to be struck should be used, preference being given to single projectiles, used, however, not as a high explosive shell for long range firing, but regulated accordingly for action against short distance targets.

Finally, the doubt as to whether a 15" projectile with heavy charge (about 40 kilos of high explosive) may be fired with safety, is not warranted. All depends upon the high explosive, and the "trinitroluene" has shown itself most stable, so stable in fact as to permit shells containing over 20 kilos, to fire at an initial velocity about 900 m.s., with about 3000 atmos pressure at breech. This explosive has been furnished the German Government by the Carbonit firm for 12" coast defense howitzers; charges being made with as much as 150 kilos per units. There is no reason, in fact, why projectiles should not be charged according to the Isham system, i.e; subdividing in two or more parts the quantity of explosive by means of elastic or rigid diaphragms.

More important and more serious have been the objections to the weight of the guns and their installation, and the consequential increase in the displacement of ships, the reduced rapidity of fire, etc.,etc. These questions are, indeed, of rather hard solution, and it is only to be hoped that the competition among the greatest establishments dealing in this line, may help in reaching some satisfactory results. One of these establishments has, meanwhile, proposed a 15" 40 caliber gun, weighing 62,000 kilos, and firing a projectile of about 880 kilos with an initial velocity of 700 m.s.. This proposition appeared so daring that it caused a storm of criticisms, and was generally met with distrust, especially as refers to the weight of the gun, the accuracy of firing, and the steadiness of its installation. However, since this gun has been adopted and the various firms entrusted with constructing the new 15" guns have been instructed to comply therewith as regards the ballistic trajectory, the following table giving the characteristics of the various types proposed, may be found useful.

G U N	12"	14"		15"	
		light - heavy		light-heavy	
Length -in cal.-	50	40	45	40	45
Total weight of gun, kilos,	56,000	52,500	72,000	62,200	82,000
Weight of projectile Kg.,	405	700	700	885	885
Weight of charge "	165	165	214	165	232
Velocity, m.	860	740	805	700	780
Init.Energy (power)t.m.	15,800	19,500	23,100	22,100	27,500
Total weight of double turret,Kg.,		619,000	685,000	693,000	787,000
"" triple "" "	689,000	835,000	962,000	935,000	1,080,000
Excess energy (power)at 6,000 m. t;m;	7,900	11,300	13,600	13,400	16,950
"""" "" 9,000 "" ""	5,450	8,400	10,200	10,200	13,050
"""" ""12,000 "" ""	3,700	6,250	7,550	7,550	10,000
Loss in elevation at 6,000 m. m.	2,9	3,0	3,0	3,1	3,0
	6,0	6,2	5,8	5,7	5,8
Total weight of charge - exp. - Kg.	13	30	30	42	42
Weight - 100 rounds- complete war charges, including powder case,	61,500	91,000	97,000	109,500	117,500
Number of rounds to be fired by gun at fighting charge,	150	240	175	300	200

The compiler of this table has taken the gun of highest power - of each caliber - and the calculations were made from a slower burning powder than is actually used in 14" or 15" - 45 calibers; moreover, it was considered that the guns of less power fired the same projectiles as the highest power guns, but with a charge equal in weight to that used in the modern 12", the breech pressure for all guns being 2800 atmos.

The results from this table amount to the following:

a) We are not able to give the relative life of the guns in rounds, it being based on the supposition that a 12" /50 gun is able to fire 150 rounds at full charges. A great deal depends upon the quality of the powder, and in any case, the aforesaid values demonstrate the advantage of reducing the initial velocity.

b) The good effects of power derived from an increase of caliber is evident from the results of the 12".

In fact, the increase of initial energy is from 48 to 75% in the heavy guns of 14" and 15", respectively, and from 26 to 43% in the lighter guns. Not considering the heavy charge.

c) The increase of efficiency is greater than the corresponding increase in the weight of the turrets, referring to the triple turrets of 12" guns. This increase of efficiency varies from 21 to 57%. When we pass to the 15" /40 cal. the corresponding increase of power rises from 70 to 170%.

d) If we limit ourselves to the two guns that we have under discussion, that of 14" /45 and 15" /40, we find as follows:

1° They have the same power, the 14"/45 cal. has an initial energy (33,100 t.m.) much superior to the 15"/40 (22,100) but the gradual increase is such that at 9,000 meters the two guns have the same striking power, and above 9,000 meters the advantage is with the 15"/40 caliber.

2° There is not much difference in the weights of double and triple gun turrets; it may even be said that triple turrets for 15"/40 caliber gun weigh less.

3° Projectiles for 15"/40 caliber guns contain 33% more high explosive than those for the 14"/45 caliber and are thus more efficient.

4° The 15"/40 caliber gun has a longer life than the 14"/45 caliber, which fact admits of no discussion.

5° The theoretical height of the trajectory is about the same at equal ranges for both guns. We shall see later how the 15"/40 caliber gun possesses a greater accuracy in spite of its relatively small initial velocity. The word "relatively" has been used althoughit is well known that up to some few years ago, 700 m.s. as initial velocity was considered more than sufficient.

As there was some doubt that 60,000 kilos was too light for a 15"/40 caliber gun, and as the corresponding English wire wound gun weighed about 81,000 kilos, the question was submitted in a general way to the Krupps. Their reply was " A 15" gun firing a projectile weighing 885 kilos at an initial velocity of 700 m.s. may only weigh 60 tons and be perfectly safe, the Krupp's 15"/50 caliber weighing 67,300 kilos fires a projectile weighing 990 kilos with an initial velocity of 840 m.s. ". This statement by this well known firm which has special experience in the construction of powerful and at the same time relatively light guns, and which are relied upon for the manner and accuracy with which they are constructed, should suffice. However, the comparison of the 380/40 caliber Krupp gun, the data of which was published in the"Taschenbuch der Kriegsflotten" for 1914, with a 381 gun, is as follows:

Type of gun		380/40 Krupp	381/40
Weight of gun	Kilos	73,900	62,200
" " charge	"	293	165
" " projectile	"	750	885
Initial Velocity, m.s.		845	700
Initial Energy, t.m.		27,330	22,100

By comparing the weights of each gun with their t.m. initial energy, it will be seen that the 381/40 weighs 2,82 kilos, while the Krupp's 380/40 weighs 2,70 and therefore the former of a moderate power weighs less than the latter of great power. We claim that the 381/40 weighs more than is necessary.

We come now to speak of the transverse resistence of the gun, taking at the same time the opportunity of correcting some erroneous statements which studis by the French Engineers Coupaye and Malaval have caused us to rectify.

It is very clear to understand what is meant by "transverse resistence of a gun". This resistence being measured by a value determined by the pressure in the bore, may have three different values which we consider as follows:

a) The value of the internal pressure to expand by which deformation of the tube ceases to be purely elastic;

b) Or else a value of such internal pressure at permanent deformation is so slight that any damage to the service of the gun does not result.

c) Or else a value of the internal pressure sufficient to put the gun immediately out of commission by bursting.

The English have designed and perhaps are still designing their guns on the value of the tension as the basis of safety with the condition that the limit of elasticity must not be surpassed. They, on account of this antiquated theory,

have given very high values to this resistance in their guns so much more so than would be necessary if they obtained their calculations from more modern and correct theories.

The greatest resistance a built up cylinder is able to withstand amounts according to them, to twice the elastic limit of the metal of the inner tube. The French also followed this theory as a basis of stability(Virgile's formula). The Germans more correctly have used for more than thirty years as the basis of stability, the amount of deformation, requiring as a condition that the tangental deformation should not surpass the limit of elasticity. In the majority of cases, with normal dimensions for the tube, when the tangental deformation reaches the limit of elasticity, there has been a radial deformation greater than the elastic limit. The German ordnance constructors disregard the permanent deformation and erroneously consider it harmless, in factto a certain extent, even advantageous to the resistance of the metal. Admitting that these conditions are founded on tangental deformation then it can be shown that the greatest resistence obtainable from a built up cylinder equals an amount 1 and 1/2 times the limit of elasticity of the metal of the inner tube. On the other hand the French constructors, on the ground of recent theories, justly give great weight to radial deformation, and design their guns on a new basis of stability, so that, the radial deformation may not reach the limit of elasticity of the metal of the inner tube. They thus obtain smaller values for the resistance of the cylinders than those obtained by the Germans as they demonstrate that the greatest obtainable from a built up cylinder is an amount equal to the elastic limit of the metal of the inner tube.

The values obtained of the resistence of given built up cylinder by the three methods mentioned are proportionally

2	I.5	I.
English	German	French

Consequently when an ordnance constructor gives a certain value t o the resistence of his guns, it is necessary for him to give the "basis" on which his guns are constructed. When the calculations of the resistence are made according to the German construction, and if it wished to utilize to the maximum the resistence of the metal, it is necessary for the inner tube be forced to hold it's initial compression by the hoops, so that the tube is compressed to it's elastic limit, in fact, constructors sometimes go beyond this limit. The English go well beyond this in their wire wound guns, but an excessive initial compression may cause grave defects even while keeping within the limits of the diameterand these guns have often confirmed this, and it also very likely causes or contributes to a greater drooping to the axis. It may also contribute to the many variations of this curve of the axis incident to the firing. The French rule which requires that the initial compression be given a smaller value than the limit of elasticity is surely praiseworthy, since it causes, within certain limits a reduction in the radial deformation during the action of the gases. So that there is also an advantage as regards the value of the resistance when it is based upon calculations as to radial deformation. Also in the case where the resistence of the gun is computed on the basis of the tangental deformation, an initial compression slightly smaller than the limit of elasticity might be found advantageous because, in spite of slight diminution in the tangental resistence, it will sensibly decrease the permanent deformation.

Of the three conditions of stability enumerated above, that of the English must be discarded as irrational, while the others deserve consideration. The latter warrants more consideration in guns that are required to withstand very high pressure.

The accuracy of fire is the result of several factors which depend on - the gun, the quality of the powder, the method of loading, the type, the weight and the size of the projectile, the mount and its installation, and finally on the personal coefficient of the gun pointer and fire control officer. Several of these facts are evidently impossible of calculation, while others are. In the case under consideration only those dependent upon the the gun and projectile will be discussed.

The factors of accuracy depending on the gun are - depth of rifling, the vibrations of the chase, which is dependent upon the length and method of installation of the gun, the regularity of the initial velocity obtained in the same calibre. As this last factor depends above all on the powder and upon the loading, it must be supposed that the powder is perfectly adapted to the gun, and that the charges are put up according to regulation.

It will take too much paper to point out and to summarize the difficult questions regarding rifling of the gun. It must be assumed that the firms which specialize in the manufacture of guns, rifle them in the most efficient manner. It is certain, moreover, that the problem is easier when the initial velocity is lower than when the projectile passes rapidly through the bore.

Experience teaches how difficult it is to prevent the erosion of rotating bands, especially those of large calibre when fired at high velocity, as well as the coppering of the rifling. As erosion of the band is a decided fact, it should receive moreconsideration that it does, both with respect to the life of the gun and the accuracy of shooting. The method of

installing the rotating band is against all rules of mechanics. There should be two bands, one near the base and the other on the fore-end, both equidistant from the center of gravity, the projectile therefore holding its equilibrium. However, as this method would not only alter the rifling but also weaken the projectile at the point where the greatest strength is required, it must be rejected, and one band used. This should be placed near the base. This causes the projectile to vibrate which is not even remedied by the enlargement of the head. The strain undergone by the band as soon as the projectile is fired, is considerable, and in being compressed, if not securely fastened, will move in its slot. If heavy projectiles were fired with a moderate initial velocity, the rotating band would cut its way into the rifling better, and under this condition a simpler band could be used, but as the velocity increases, it becomes more difficult to apply the band to the projectile and also to prevent the erosion, which has been; so far, never overcome. In-vain, were larger and more complicated forms of bands tried; they never gave satisfactory results, and everyone knows that heavy projectiles fired at high velocity show, on this account, a defect of stability on the trajectory. Bands made of other metals, soft iron, alloy, etc., have been attempted, but without success. There is no doubt but that the covering of the bore with copper even if it is not the greatest cause of rapid erosion of guns, at least it greatly increases it when heavy projectiles are fired at high velocity. I affirm that it is indeed, difficult to fire a 14" and 15" gun at a velocity of 800 meters without producing complete erosion of the bands, and I am confirmed in this by the fact that the American 14" guns have a most complicated rifling devised particularly to reduce to a minimum such defects. It is

probable that a heavy projectile, within certain limits, is more accurate with a moderate initial velocity than with a high velocity due to the one fact that the rotating band cuts itself into the rifling better, thus giving better stability on its trajectory.

Among the many technical articles published in the "Preparazione" on the question of the armaments for the new super-dreadnoughts there were two in which the authors after giving the military reasons for adopting the large caliber guns with moderate power, showed what good results could be obtained with a 16" with much less power than the one considered by the Navy, that is a gun of initial velocity of 890 m.s. firing a projectile weighing 880 kilos. To get this less power a gun was proposed of 45 rather than 50 caliber length, considering that such length of 45 caliber would give greater regularity to the initial velocity and accordingly better accuracy. There is no doubt that regularity of initial velocity improves in proportion as the coefficient of expansion of the gases increases, measured by the relation between the total volume of the bore and that of the chamber. Accordingly, in order to realize a given power an increase in the length of the gun gives a smaller chamber and a larger volume to the bore, consequently a higher coefficient of expansion of the gas. Therefore, firing with moderate power, a gun of 45 caliber has every possibility of giving an I. V. more regular than a 40 caliber; therefore a gun of 50 caliber would be even more superior. In order to avoid mistakes, we must determine whether it's possible to calculate the differences of regularities between the two 16" guns of 40 and 45 calibers. All cases must be considered where moderate power is used. It is well known that the regularity of the I.V. is not proportional to the coefficient of expansion and that the difference between

successive v locities tends to decrease as the velocity increases. Be that as it may, as the 15" /40 caliber gun has a coefficient of expansion greater than seven, about that of siege and field guns, which are guns of large coefficients of expansion, it is evident that an increase of this coefficient, already so high, should not cause in practice, a change in the regularity of the I.V. Nevertheless the accuracy of the gun would not, from this point of view, be increased enough to compensate for the great inconvenience of having a gun of such extreme length. The great length given to large power guns in order to give them high I.V. has made them very heavy and cumbersome, so that the ordnance constructors have welcomed with delight the return of the relatively short gun which makes the solution of the problem as regards the location of the main battery much simpler. The long chase of these guns extending so far beyond the turret ports are very vulnerable, even to small gun fire. At Eastburne a Hotckiss projectile pierced completly a chase of a 12" gun. At Shoeburryness a 7.5" gun was struck in the chase by a 37 mm. projectile and was put entirely out of commission.

The greatest trouble with long guns are droop and whip, which is more evident in wire wound guns than in the built up guns.

In an important study on large caliber guns, from a point of view of the constructor, there were taken three guns, the 12" with a length of bore of 15,25 meters, and a 15" with a bore length of 19,05 meters, and also a 13.5" gun; all of 50 calibers. There was an unrifled portion in the 12" of 3.05 meters, and in the 15" gun 3.81 meters.

The portion of the gun protected by the turret is, generally, about from 15 to 30 calibers; hence a 15" gun, 50 calibers long, would be exposed considerably more than a

15"/40 or a 12"/50 notwithstanding it being much more solidly armored. This is an important reason against the adoption of lengthy supercalibers, as well as against the facility of their construction. It is indeed a most difficult task that of handling, forging, exposing to thermic changes, steel tubes, 19 meters long, besides turning them within and without by a few tenths of a millimeter, then heating them and placing them vertically and securely one over the other avoiding their cracking or sliding. This explains why such constructions have become a monopoly of some few establishments which on that account claim such exhorbitant prices (only warranted by the risks incurred).

Long guns are liable to droop and vibrate violently under fire, wire wound guns are known to be worse in this respect. Drooping increases as the length of the gun increases. The drooping in built up guns to that of wire wound guns of like power, caliber and length is in the proportion of 3 to 5. A well constructed 12"/50 caliber gun has a droop at the muzzle of from 4 to 5', of 3' if a built up gun: such deformation varies from 4 to 7' for the 13.5" gun, and from 8 to 9^{mm} for the wire wound 15". This deformation if caused by the weight of the chase, varies with the athmospherical and thermic conditions, which cause the gun to be heated irregularly throughout its length.

If a 12"/50 caliber gun is pointed in a given direction, so that the axis passes through the center of the breech and if it is kept in this position for twentyfour hours, the center of the gun traces an elipse, the major axis of which is about 6 millimeters and the minor 3. This movement becomes greater as the length of the gun increases and it is plain that the droop which reaches as much as 7 or 8 miilimeters in a 12", is detrimental to accuracy, because the direction of the pro-

jectile is that derived from the fore end of the gun, this direction makes with the axis that passes through the center of the breech, a variable angle and of unknown value. This prevents the line of sight from being parallel to the last direction of the rifling, and it is most difficult to construct the sights parallel to the axis of the gun in the breech. At a range of 9000 meters and with the regular setting of the sights, there is an error in range of from 15 to 18 meters for every pinute of arc at that angle.

A fourth reason for inaccuracy of long guns is due to vibrations called by the English "whip". In the case of the 50 caliber gun the number of vibrations varies from 100 to 150 per minute, and at the center of the gun reaches an average speed of 6 meters a second, and in wire wound guns of 15 meters. The only way to decrease the whip if not to eliminate it entirely, is to build the supercaliber guns short, and by the built-up method; there is no reason to believe that the vibrations of the chase of a 45 or 50 caliber gun will reduce the initial velocity.

It is obvious that since the period of oscillations of the chase has no connection with the flight of the projectile, in the bore it may, at the instant that the projectile passes from the gun and receives the acceleration due to the gas bursting violently from it, be either in a state of rest or have an upward or downward movement.

The weight of the charge of a modern 12"/50 caliber gun of high I.V. is about 1/7 the weight of the projectile, and with a normal pressure in the chase of about 1000 atmos. the greatest velocity of the blast is from 1670 to 1820 meters per second. In other words, the blast striking the base of the projectile has a velocity of about 760 meters per second with the probable effect of accelerating the velocity of the projectile from 15 to 25 ms. at the instant of leaving the gun.

In the case of a gun whose resistence to drooping is small, the projectile may receive at the muzzle, while it is still in the gun, a velocity towrds the top or bottom of from 15 to 25 m. per s. in addition to the velocity of translation; in other words, the general direction of the blast may be inclined 10 or 15 degrees with respect to the axis of the projectile. The result is, upon leaving the gun, the projectile has a movement, more or less regular, like that of a top which continues for 500 meters and probably further.

This irregular initial movement has been studied and it has been developed that the projectile in its course makes a very regular spiral turning about the middle of the projectile at a rate 10 to 20 times that of the rifling at the muzzle and it may be from 5 to 30 centimeters from the direction of the chase before the discharge. The projectile produces rough elliptical apertures in the paste-board screen placed before the muzzle; the major axis is about 1 1/4 to 1 3/4 of the caliber of the projectile, while the minor axis is about equal to the caliber.

This form of the apertures indicates, that the axis of the projectile makes an angle of about 12 degrees with the trajectory. If the inclination of the major axis to the vertical is measured, it is found that as the projectile increases its distance from the gun, this major axis has a rotary motion, which may be clock-wise, or anti-clock-wise, the same gun giving different results from shot to shot. The track of the trajectory of a projectile can only be examined for a short distance in consequence of the curvature of the trajectory; but from the results obtained at this time it appears that the projectile as it leaves the muzzle of a long gun jumps up or down or to the right or left. It is not possible to say at this time what influence on this irregular movement, the cutting of the rotating band has, or what effect is produced by the center of gravity of the projectile being out-

side of the axis; the entire question, however, merits attention especially with regard to wire wound guns which give, at short ranges - for example proving of armor - results so irregular that the particular object of the firing is frustrated.

There is also in long guns another cause of inaccuracy which is more exaggerated than in the short guns; this is the interval of time which elapses between the instant that the pointer presses the trigger to fire and the instant the projectile leaves the muzzle. This interval is formed of two variable parts: the first, of .08 seconds to .1 seconds is the time necessary to explode the primer, to ignite the charge, and for the rotating band to cut its way into the rifling; the second is, .022 seconds to .035 seconds, and is the time taken by the projectile to pass through the bore of a 50 caliber gun. In other words the aforesaid interval of time is about .122 seconds, for a 12"/50 caliber gun, and about .135 seconds for the 15"/50 caliber. These values may increase if the firing apparatusses are not perfect. It is easy to show that in the case of a modern ship with a moderate roll, and assuming that the elevation of the gun does not change between the instant of pressing the trigger and the instant the projectile leaves the muzzle, that this aforesaid interval of time corresponds to an error in elevation of about 16′ for the 12"/50 and of about 21′ for the 15"/50, thus, for a range of 9000 meters there is an error for each degree of arc of about 15 meters for the 12", and of about 16 meters for a 15"; it thus becomes evident that a roll of 5 degrees will produce a significant loss in range which becomes even greater as the length of the gun increases.

It is not enough that guns withstand the tension produced by more or less heavy charges, but above all it is necessary for them to be accurate within certain limits. From a mechanical point of view accuracy is only obtained with rigidity. It consists in the execution of uniform shots with constant deviations, since the pointer, reading in the range table that a given angle of elevation,

≠) Note:- ′ equals minute of arc.

corresponds to a given range, must be sure that by setting the sight accordingly the gun will be properly pointed, and that the projectile will depart at the desired angle and not at an unknown angle resulting from an algebric sum of various values that are: the angle of elevatio, the angle of depression and the angle of vibration, etc.,etc. The pointer must be certain that the probable errors of range will be included in the limits of the calculation, and not beyond; however, as we have seen, taken account, evidently, of the interval of time between pressing the trigger and the leaving of the projectile from the muzzle, the 12"/50 will give considerable variations depending on the position of the ship with respect to her inclination to the waves at the instant of firing: errors that for a dispersion of 6 degrees should amount to 300 to 400 meters at a range of 8000 meters.

There is, evidently, reason to doubt the accuracy of a 12"/50, even though new, without even considering its very rapid erosion from shot to shot which would render such accuracy in a short time hypothetical. Everything being considered it might not be unsafe to say, that our 12"/40 will be at least as accurate,if not more so, than the 12"/45 or /50, and much more so if the projectiles have dope of a greater radius.

It has been claimed by some one who is now in favor of the relatively light and large calibre gun, that the reduction in weight allows at the moment of firing an increased strain on the mount, in consequence of which it is more durable, and the total weight of the installation is thereby increased. The result thus obtained is therefore, contrary to the object desired, that of securing less weight in the total installation. But the objection, also evidently well founded, has small value, because only one side of the question has been considered; considering for example, the speaking strains and the effects on the mount, as if these were the only conditions that would cause any change in the weight of the gun. If two guns of 12"/40 calibre of the same power are compared, one of which weighs

about 63 tons, and the other about 82 (as those adopted by the Italian Navy); the latter will show less breaking strain with the same recoil. Logically, the amount of the two 63 ton gun with its supports, is heavier than the corresponding parts of the 82 ton gun; but it is doubtful whether this is of real practical importance which could be easily shown, if other features of greater importance to be considered warranted it. We should consider,, in fact, that the weight of the gun not only effects the breaking strains and the value thereof, but also, as follows:

1° The transverse dimensions of the gun-

Of two guns of the same caliber, length and power, the heavier certainly has larger transverse dimensions. The 82 ton gun has a breech diameter greater by 100 to 200 millimeters than that of the 63 ton gun, thus it is evident that this increase of diameter at the breech cannot but cause a considerable increase between the axis of the guns in the same turret. This requires an increase in diameter of the turret, and therefore, in the weight, both intrinsically and on account of the larger amount of armor required.

2° The conditions of equilibrium of the mobile parts of the turret -

The heavier guns weigh more heavily on the forward part of the turret, so that in order to bring the center of gravity to the axis, it is necessary to increase the weight of the aftere part of the turret, which evidently causes another increase in weight to the total installation

3° The necessary power for pointing -

The heavy guns require heavier training and elevating parts. The motors and especially those for elevating, must be more powerful due to the heavier mass to be moved, therefore, heavier the gun, heavier should be its motors. Therefore in order to utilize the same useful power, the heavier gun allows lightening the mount with its supports, but this increase of weight of the gun finally increases the total weight of the system.

On making a rough comparison of the two guns, it was found that this last increased the total weight to about 20,000 kg. for a two gun turret which would mean about 30,000 kg. for a triple turret. This is equivalent to saying that a ship armed with 4 12"/50 guns in four turrets would be heavier by [illegible] tons with the 37 ton guns than with the 22 ton guns.

That has been said confirms with precise the decision of our Navy to select for the new ships a 12"/50 of moderate L. V. Let many have found it odd that we should have adopted two different types of guns, the built-up and wire wound having the ballistic powers but differing in weight about 11 tons due entirely to the different construction. If it results that a built-up of 37 tons presents equal guarantees of perfectness, security, of strength, etc, why was it not adopted for all the new ships? and especially if by its adoption a great saving in the total weight of the system is secured? It is well known how the English constructors have defended their system which has been attacked by many and seldom accepted by the majority of artillerists. The many discussions on this question and the still more recent mathematical theories that show all we should retain:

(a) In all guns of either construction, the elastic transverse resistance, measured by the internal pressure which it is able to support, without suffering permanent deformation of the inside of the bore, has for its greatest limit, the limit of elasticity of their internal sections. This statement has been amply explained in the proceedings.

(b) The wire-wound guns do not offer, under this point of view, a margin of safety greater than the other gun, and also there are reasons to believe, that they do not bind themselves together to such an extent as do the built-up guns.

(c) The permanent deformation of the internal tube tends to interrupt the service of the gun and probably produces in the same class of wire-wound guns an internal pressure smaller than that necessary to do the same damage in a built-up gun.

(d) The wrapping of wire tends to produce, if not to break, irregular deformation of the tube much more than does the building up of a gun. This will cause a premature explosion of the shell which oftens happens in guns of this type.

(e) The longitudinal resistance of wire-wound guns is extremely small and is much less than that in the built-up guns.

(f) The English wire-wound guns weigh more than the built-up guns of any nation, in fact the Naval Annual gives the following data---

	Weight in kilos		Initial Velocity f.s.	Muzzle Initial Energy
	Gun	Projectile		
GUN - 12"/45 cal.				
Italia (45 cal.)	64,100	417	880	15,[illegible]
Armstrong	50,[illegible]	385.5	865	14,710
British Navy	47,080	386.5	854	14,791
Vickers	56,788	385.5	862	14,[illegible]
U.S.Navy.	55,750	340	833.5	13,190
Bethlehem	51,[illegible]	394.6	850	14,[illegible]
Schneider	56,000	374.7	893	15,116
Austria (Skoda)	42,769		800	13,671
Krupp (heavy)	47,700	390	890	15,[illegible]
Bofors	43,300	349	830	14,[illegible]
Krupp (light)	45,000	390	890	15,[illegible]
GUN - 13"/50 cal.				
Armstrong	63,000	402.4	914	18,[illegible]
British Navy	62,000	381.5	914	16,840
Coventry	60,[illegible]	381.5	914	18,[illegible]
Bethlehem	64,337	394.6	884	17,727
Vickers	64,211	385.5	917	18,[illegible]
Schneider	56,384	374.7	850	17,[illegible]
U.S.Navy	55,116	394.6	869	18,[illegible]
Krupp (heavy)	63,100	390	929	17,510
Bofors	63,310	390	907	16,[illegible]
Ansaldo	49,210	649.5	846	16,[illegible]
Krupp(light)	47,300	390	859	17,610
GUN - 14"/45 cal.				
Armstrong	87,460	712	784	21,[illegible]
Coventry	73,700	683	786	20,[illegible]
Vickers	79,272	696	769.8	20,[illegible]
Ansaldo	79,[illegible]	[illegible]	797	20,[illegible]
Schneider	76,900	670	806	
Krupp (356 mm.)	73,000	[illegible]	822	[illegible],360
Bethlehem	63,150	635	785	18,712
U.S.Navy.	60,[illegible]	635	79	
GUN - 16"/45 cal.				
Armstrong	96,000	1[illegible]5	764	[illegible],0[illegible]
Ansaldo.	95,0[illegible]	790	784	[illegible],317
Vickers	94,484	1[illegible].5	782	[illegible],171
Ansaldo.	94,484	920	802	[illegible],[illegible]
Schneider	88,280	870	750	

Note:- The heading "Gun - 14"/45 corresponds to a 406/45 cal. It will be noted that the Krupp gun under this heading is a 356 mm.

Without going into the matter too deeply it will be enough that we note the following facts- our 1[illegible]/40 weighs more than the 1[illegible]"/50 of the U.S. Navy; that there is a difference of [illegible]75kg. between the 1[illegible]/50 Vickers and the Armstrong gun of the same ballistic data; that the light 1[illegible]"/[illegible] Krupp gun having a greater initial energy, weighs [illegible]190 Kg. less, the heavier type, 15900 Kg. less; that the Armstrong 1[illegible]"/50 differs hardly a hundred weight from the 14"/45 installed on the Texas and Nevada.

It is said that the Ministro delle Marine has decided to require with the first gun each of both systems, not only the usual proof firing but a particular proof of resistance, by firing from each three shots with normal charges but with projectiles 1/4 heavier so that the pressure would reach 1800 atmos.; these would be followed by three more shots with such charges and projectiles to bring the chase pressure to 900 atmos., the normal pressure not exceeding 700 atmos.. The measurement of the bore, after these shots must not exceed those allowed in the contract. It is not believed that these methods are such as to dispel all doubts regarding the quality of the metal in the bore. It is clear, in fact, that since the dimensions of the bore after abnormal firing should not exceed those agreed to in the contract, the constructors should keep within the least allowance for the first model in order that the gun, under the pressure of abnormal firing will undergo a permanent deformation until it reaches the limitation of the greatest allowance; this taking place without warranting any objection on the part of the Royal Navy, although it is aware that such deformation has taken place.

The assurance that the gun has not undergone permanent deformations on account of the augmented pressure, can only be obtained by requiring that the dimensions of the gun must remain unchanged or in other words that the measurements must be identical before and after firing.

It is of course understood that pressures shall only be such as were agreed upon and in order to avoid errors, measurements should be made by the same parties with the same instruments after as well as before the firing. Undue wear of the gun or faulty readjustment after a shot should not warrant any changes being made during the firing, since, the initial velocity having been purposely made moderate with a view to increasing the gun's life it does not seem possible that six shots should cause erosion sufficient to be measured, if so, it would only help to demonstrate that the metal of the bore was anything but what was required.

The Ministry of the Marine should take advantage of this good opportunity to study the wire-wound gun and the built-up gun with respect to their accuracy and their aptitude to suffer by erosion. We have already dealt withthe reasons how wire-wound guns are less accurate than the built-up guns, why should not experiments be carried on in this connection to ascertain and solve the question? The same might be said regarding erosion. There are many that hold that the system of construction has something to do with the "droop" and that wire-wound guns wear out sooner than others. I do not feel sure as to this point although recent studies help to show that droop and vibration both resist erosion especially in the chase. I do ~~see~~ think, however, that erosion occurs more readily in wire-wound guns, as the latter are generally constructed with an inferior grade of metal which could not be used in built-up guns. There is no doubt but General Crozier ,U.S.A. Chief of Ordnance, recommended the adoption of wire-wound guns for coast defense,owing to the possibility of building them with metal which cost L/ less and also because they weigh theoretically less although we have found that they are heavier. In conclusion,these two points erosion and accuracy do not seem to have been considered as fully as they deserve, and we only hope that the Navy will not disregard this opportunity to arrive at a definite solution as to which system is the best.

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900)

Need not be returned.

SUBJECT Earthquake - Central Italy.

From T No. 25. Date January 16, 1915.

Replying to O. N. I. No. ——— Date ———

1. The shock which caused all the damage was at 7.52, Wednesday morning, the 13th of January, and lasted from 15 to 20 seconds. It was not until the following morning that sufficient reports had come into Rome showing that a catastrophe had occurred. The damaged section is in the Abruzzi mountains due East from Rome and distant about 75 kilometers as the crow flies. I offered to go to the damaged section early Thursday morning, but did not get away until 4 p.m. The Italian Government had discouraged foreign aid so our trip was purely one of investigation, although the motor was packed with blankets. We got into the western section of the damaged zone at 9 p.m., having passed a continuous column of refugees pouring down from the hill towns into the Campagna - shocks were still occurring according to the inhabitants, but they were light and not felt by us in the automobile. The first seriously damaged town, Sora Caletani, situated on the top of a small mountain, was reported to us by a passing Italian relief party in an automobile, so with them to guide us we reached it about 9 p.m. About fifty soldiers under the command of a captain had taken charge and would not allow any one into the town after dark. All work of rescue had been halted at dark owing to precarious condition of walls, although six bodies were supposed to be still buried. At Fiuggi where we spent the night there were only 3 killed, 5 wounded. The next morning we passed through many towns where slight damage was visible with few victims, arriving at noon at Isola. This town was being used as a concentration camp and was in charge of Army Medical officers. It was shockingly inefficient. There were 9000 refugees here. The officers urgently requested food. In walking about the town I found a butcher shop intact with meat for sale in abundance which was very surprising after the statement of the officers. It is needless to say we presented the camp with large supply of meat. The camp was very poorly equipped, and as a far as I could see with no organization. As an example in being shown through an improvised operating room I was dumbfounded to find an excited circle of men and officials almost coming to blows within ten feet of a young girl in the agony of an operation. The girl was conscious with her head in a very mangled condition, and of course other wounded were in the same enclosure. The camp apparently had no blankets and appreciated our supply. The next town visited by us was Sora, called by Italians "Little Rome". Here there was not a house standing. The Army had taken charge here, but with an entirely too small a detachment of troops. However, there was some organization and were well supplied with food but lacked tents and wood for shelters. We were forced to turn back here as the roads over the mountains into the damaged zone had been destroyed, and as we were only sent out to investigate and report on what kind of supplies were mostly required.

2. The authorities were apparently very quick to get the visible wounded away to hospitals in Rome, but although told by officials that the ruins of Sora still covered many people, there were very few men engaged in digging them out. The streets were packed with men, but few piles of debris were being cleared.

3. There were several towns completely destroyed such as Avezzano. Not a house remains and even the people who happened to be in the streets at the time of the earthquake were killed by falling walls. The loss here alone is reported at 9000 - a mortality of 90%. Rome and Naples are taking survivors and wounded. The Government has been severely criticised in its rescue work, but I do not believe it is entirely justified. The damaged country is very inaccessible - one single track railroad runs into it and many of the severely damaged towns are miles from it and situated on the tops and sides of mountains. I estimate the dead close to 25,000 with wounded and homeless at 30,000.

4. Owing to the request of the Italian Government that no help from foreign governments was desired, there was no official Relief Expedition from the Embassy - but a party of Americans, including several members of the Embassy Staff went to Avezzano and distributed food which had been sent up by train.

5. Light shocks are still being felt daily - even as I write this report a light shock has occurred, this being eight days after.

6. No buildings fell in Rome, only a few statues - but many walls were cracked.

NAVAL PRECAUTIONS IN REGARD TO NEUTRAL VESSELS ENTERING GERMAN PORTS.

Z 43 January 16, 1915.

The following account of the methods employed by the German Navy with regard to ships entering the mouth of the Weser are typical of the way the matter is handled at all German ports.

The objects desired are :-

1. To examine and determine the nationality of all persons on board and to arrest enemies.

2. To prevent the location and courses through the mine fields being known.

3. To prevent radio communication while in German waters.

The proceedings are no more than those which a wise policy dictates under such conditions as prevail at the present time.

> " As soon as the ship reaches the mouth of the Weser it is stopped by a cruiser, which sends an armed guard on board to inspect the crew and papers and search the vessel for contraband. If the ship carries a wireless, this is dismantled and the important parts are sent to the local admiralty for safekeeping, being redelivered to the ship when it has reached the mouth of the Weser on the outward voyage. About six miles below this city* the entire crew, including the master , is sent below deck while the vessel is piloted by German officials through the mine fields. I understand the German officials, during this time, accept the responsibility for the vessel's safety. The crew is also given a thorough medical inspection. This method is adopted with all foreign vessels regardless of nationality. "

*Bremerhaven

Feb. 8/15

WEEKLY POLITICAL SUMMARY.

The Change in the Imperial Treasury Office - Helfferich's Task - The New Arrangement of the Imperial Finances - Retirement of Count Berchtold - French Threatenings and French Defeats.

By Paul Michaelis

Translated from the Berliner-Tageblatt of Sunday, 17 January, 1915.

That new times require also new men is often maintained in theory. As soon however as a new time is proclaimed it usually means that the thoroughly conversant persons are now indispensable. The stability of the Imperial Government showed no change upon the outbreak of the war. The Secretary of State for the Interior, who had gone on a long leave of absence from which he would hardly have returned to his office again under normal conditions, felt suddenly the necessity to return, to undertake a still heavier burden of work and responsibility. The hitherto Secretary of the Imperial Treasury Kühn is the first one who leaves a leading position in the Imperial Government. With him goes an experienced official whose state of health would under other conditions hardly have prevented his doing duty still longer. But it is well understood that he did not feel equal to the new problems and aims to be accomplished which the war has brought to light. Herr Kühn sprang readily, if hardly without inward reluctance, into the place vacated by the retirement of Wermuth in the Spring of 1912. With very superficial means, which Wermuth had refrained from, he brought the Imperial finances into apparent equilibrium.

Now it is indeed true that one does not pour new wine into old bottles. The official announcement concerning the change in the Imperial Treasury Secretaryship speaks of the immediately needed reorganization of the Imperial finances. And if there is anything of special importance with the rebuilding of our trade relations with abroad after the war, it is to bring through the Imperial finance policy with a new spirit. Perhaps Herr Kühn had drafted the general principles for this, but he could hardly have established its practical working. For that an unbroken initiative is necessary, an unconsumed fresh store of force. We may assume that Herr Helfferich has at disposition the necessary conditions in full measure. Undoubtedly he is a man of unusual capacity, and at the same time, in spite of his youth, of great experience. He has been tried in the saddle, in the most different positions, in scientific as well as in practical fields, and among those who know him more intimately the conviction is general that he has everywhere shown extraordinary efficiency.

Like Bernhard Dernburg, Karl Helfferich comes from the banking world, but he has likewise gone through the Academic School. That he is fully aware of the difficulties of his new office may be taken for granted. However the war may turn out, and even should the transition time be eased by a considerable war indemnity, Herr Helfferich well knows that a people must be financially strong in themselves if they are to confront the changes of the future with confidence. We must reorganize not only the Imperial finances but the whole Empire, if there is to be an undisturbed rise. The Secretary of the Imperial Treasury, although his position will be in form dependent upon the Imperial Chancellor, will occupy the most weighty place in the Imperial Administration in the years following the war. It may be said in favor

of the new man that he brings to the necessities of the future complete understanding and will therefore not be experimenting from the council board. In other respects we wait upon his actions. The time to prefer definite wishes and demands is perhaps not too far distant.

In allied Austro-Hungary likewise an important change in office has meanwhile taken place. To the place of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Count Berchtold, Freiherr von Burian has succeeded. That Count Berchtold did not cling to his office but on the contrary had repeatedly expressed the wish to retire to private life is well known. And it may be regarded as equally certain that nothing other than merely personal wishes were the immediate cause of the change. The change in the representation of external relations of the Danube monarchy will bring political effects in its train. It is significant in this regard that the new chief in the Vienna Foreign Office may be regarded as an unreserved follower of the Hungarian Premier Count Tisza. So the change contains significance of a stronger expression of Hungarian interests in the Double Monarchy. In what may in particular the foreign relations of Austro-Hungary will in the future make itself felt, it would hardly be the time now to discuss in detail. In one respect, however, one may cherish firm confidence: the loyalty of the new Minister of Foreign Affairs to the alliance, like that of Count Tisza is beyond any doubt. More than ever will our enemies have to reckon that Austro-Hungary stands together with the German Empire in unbreakable brotherhood in arms and in the deepest sense of solidarity, and will succeed together.

We all know that still greater efforts are necessary. When one reads the speech with which the re-elected President Deschanel in the French Chamber and the President of the Senate Dubost greeted the representatives of the French people, one must see quite clearly that France is still a long way from recognizing herself as beaten. M. Deschanel will drive out the Germans, deliver Belgium, and incorporate Alsace-Lorraine again in France; M. Dubost goes somewhat further, in that he threatens us with pitiless extinction. Although there may be there the usual exaggeration with which it is sought to inspire the French nation with courage, it would be nevertheless a mistake to assume that there is yet any considerable pressure for peace among the French people. At present the language of the sword is the only one that is understood by our opponents. All the greater is the satisfaction felt that the very day of assembling of the French Parliament brought some important successes to the German arms. In the Eastern Argonnes the German troops pushed forward successfully to the Roman Road and caused the French a loss of about 3500 men, in prisoners, killed and wounded. And far beyond on the North bank of the Aisne the victorious fighting went on near Soissons. Here the troops of the Mark have given the French a thorough defeat, threw them back over the Aisne, and took more than 5000 prisoners. When one considers that this part of the wide extended battlefield is the nearest Paris and only about 60 kilometres from it, it may be supposed that with this new success of the German arms makes the French parliamentarians quite uncomfortable. We trust that it will go still further forward, in the West as in the East.

Need not be returned.

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TAKING OVER MERCHANT VESSELS AT OUTBREAK OF WAR.

Z 47 January 18, 1915.

13340 December 15, 1915.

In answer to an inquiry to the Reichs-Marine-Amt I have received the following reply :-

" Imperial Navy Office, Berlin, January 16, 1915.

Sir:-

I have the honor to reply to your letter of the 9th of January 1915 - No.736 - as follows:-

According to № 33 of War Liability Law the owners of ships and craft are obliged to place their craft at the disposition of the government for war purposes when requested to do so.

There are no legal regulations regarding the placing in service of merchant vessels during war.

No merchant ship goes at the beginning of war into the possession of the government without summons. The government calls for those ships which are intended to be used for war purposes and makes a contract with the owner, or pays him an indemnificatánn based upon the estimate of a commission appointed for that purpose.

All merchant ships not called into service retain the same status which they had before outbreak of the war.

Respectfully

(Sig.) Rheinhaben
Korvettenkapitän
Acting Chief of the Central Department
of the Reichs-Marine-Amt.".

An attempt will be made to procure the War Liability Law (Kriegsleistungsgesetz) and forward the same if obtainable.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

Need not be returned.

SUBJECT

HYDROGRAPHIC NOTES - NAVIGATION of STEAMERS from AMERICA to BREMEN.

From (H) Z *No.* 79 *Date* January 18, 1915

Replying to O. N. I. No. *Date* 191

The S.S.GREENBRIER, after being released at Kirkwall, England, was told by the King's Harbormaster in Kirkwall to steer to Bergen and follow the Norwegian coast. The captain of this steamer took a fix on Oskerey Light and steered E NE approximately to Fair Island. From there he went E 1/2 N 160 miles to Slottero Light. He followed the Norwegian coast, keeping about four miles off, past Christiania to Hantsholm, steering S SE and then followed the Danish coast to Esbjeig. There he was ordered to Lister Deep buoy, where he was told that he would get a pilot. At Lister Deep buoy a German pilot came aboard and took the steamer into Bremerhaven. No mines were sighted by this steamer.

Neutral steamers that are forced to anchor in the North Sea within German waters are required to have all lights out at night, and they are not permitted to sound fog signals when at anchor. The German pilots who have gone aboard American steamers to take them into Bremerhaven have thus far been regular pilots. Each incoming neutral steamer, however, is escorted by one or two steam fishing boats which at the present time are manned by the Navy and have Naval officers in command. Orders are given to the pilot by the officers of these fishing boats. The pilot takes the steamer into Bremerhaven following the orders and information given to him by the officers on the fishing boats. The steamer may or may not follow in the wake of one of these steam fishing boats. On approaching the inner mine field and the defences of the city, all hands on the neutral ship are required to lay below and the ship is taken on into its dock by the German pilot and assistants. The captain also is not allowed to be on the bridge. They are required to remain below until just before docking, the period of time being about one hour.

The S.S.CAROLINE which set course from Boston to Bremen, put into Falmouth to have its cargo and papers examined. From Falmouth this steamer steered 75 deg. to the Isle of Wight where an English pilot came aboard and took it to the Downs. The boarding officer at the Downs gave the positions of the mine fields between Galiper Light and the Dutch coast. From Galiper Light the Captain of this steamer steered E 1/4 N to North Hinder and from North Hinder to Schown lightship, E 1/2 S. From the Downs the S.S.CAROLINE steered through the mine fields, following information given, without a pilot to the Dutch coast and thence to Esbjeig. At this place orders were received from consular agent to proceed to Lister Deep buoy and await German pilot. The German pilot came aboard at Lister Deep buoy. This steamer sighted but one mine and that was about twenty miles NW from Schown lightship, off the Dutch coast near the entrance to Flushing.

On arriving at the entrance to the Weser river, the steamer is usually boarded and an inspection of the crew made by the German authorities. Any citizen belonging to a belligerent country and any suspects are removed by the German authorities.

Feb 8, 15

January 19, 1915.

From: Lieutenant B. C. Hooper, U. S. Navy.
To: Director of Naval Intelligence

Subject: General notes on European situation; not heretofore covered in my reports to the Naval Attache in London.

1. The principle impressions made on me when I visited Belgium were:

(1) The spirit of the German Officers and men. They are absolutely convinced that Germany is fighting for right and that Germany will win. The feeling is so strong that a stranger visiting the country becomes immediately a party to that spirit, in spite of any previous feeling to the contrary.

(2) The German Officers I talked with unofficially convinced me that the atrocity reports were practically all untrue, and that most drastic punishments were given to German Soldiers who were even suspected of such crimes. The Germans felt sorry to attack the Belgians when the war started but stated that the Belgians had treated them so badly, by sniping, etc., after promising not to, that in many cases it was necessary to kill civilians and destroy portions of cities, in order to put a stop to this.

(3) The destruction in Belgium, although very great, is not really as bad as one would believe by reading the papers. From the papers, for example, one gained the idea that Antwerp was seriously damaged by the bombardment; whereas, as a matter of fact that large city has perhaps not over two hundred houses destroyed.

(4) The small towns, of but a few thousand inhabitants, suffered most, due to the terrific house to house fighting carried on.

(5) The prices of food in Belgium, in November, were about normal. With the exception of rice, white bread, and gasoline, supplies seemed plentiful. In Brussels, for example, the hotel prices were normal, both for accomodation and meals.

(6) The German organization appeared to be as effective as advertised, with the exception of the train service in southern Belgium. This service was very sluggish and was used practically entirely for conveying wounded men from the front to Germany, and for carrying supplies. The troops themselves were all marching.

(7) There was great jealousy between regulars and volunteers. The volunteer automobile corps were looked down upon by the regulars, and the aviators considered themselves much superior to all other branches of the service.

(8) All hands have great patriotism and love for the Kaiser. Although the men are not of course anxious to be killed at the front, each is perfectly willing to die if by so doing the Kaiser will be aided in any way.

(9) The German news was more truthful than the British, although neither was more than half the truth. The British news was more of a boasting nature.

(10) Great consideration is given the soldiers in such matters as mail, etc. The German officers are much kinder to the soldiers in war time and the soldiers cannot understand such acts of kindness.

(11) I saw no German officer or man under the influence of liquor.

(2) (1) In England there was not much war spirit and recruiting was very poor. The poor men of England considered that if there was necessity for them to enlist they would be conscripted. The higher classes responded readily to the colors.

(2) The average Englishman feels that it will be all right anyway, that there will be plenty of soldiers without him, so does not enlist.

(3) The English are the best fighters, due to their individual coolness and thinking ability and consequently an equal number of British can usually beat the same number of Germans.

(4) In England all hands realize everything depends on the fleet and they are watching reports from the fleet closely, and although they feel that the fleet should win in any event they are a little doubtful in their own minds as to what to expect.

(5) Mr. Churchill is very severly criticised for taking too much authority from the Admiralty Officers. Also Lord Kitchener and Mr Churchill are criticised because the censorship is considered inefficient. The popular feeling in England is that a censorship is a proper thing but ~~that~~ the present one allows things to be published which should be censored and does not take the public into confidence on other matters sufficiently.

(6) The fleet is said to be generally on the North West coast of Scotland, although it is said sometimes to cruise on the East Coast in the vicinity of Rosyth, in Scotland.

(7) Early in the war the British were very much afraid of submarines. Since they learned that German submarines could do practicaly no harm to ships cruising above ten knots speed, however, they have lost that fear. With the possible exception of the Formidable, of which I know nothing, no submarine has been able to make a hit against a ship moving above ten knots speed. I have heard it said that the submarines could never be effective until their cruising speeds were practicably doubled and torpedo tubes were constructed to fire abeam.

(8) A gentleman who has to do with part of a submarines equipment in machinery both for our service and for the British informed me that the British specifications for all submarine machinery were much higher than those of our service.

(9) From conversation with a civilian from Dover I learned that some of the British cruisers were being fitted with spars about fifteen foot long which were secured under-neath the bow just abaft the ram and projected downward and outward, with the idea of exploding mines before the latter had a chance to strike the hull. By exploding the mine so far from the hull the concussion at the hull is not sufficient to sink the ship.

(10) A gentleman from Belfast, Ireland, told me that recently in Belfast two light draft steamships were converted into wooden models of battleships; that is, a wooden structure was built around the hull of each and wooden turrets, guns, etc., fitted, so that, from a short distance away these looked like battleships. No one knew what these were for, except it has been suggested that they might be anchored as bait for German submarines, in the North Sea, and the torpedoes of the latter would pass underneath the hull due to the light draft.

(11) I heard also, unofficially, that the Allies, on the western Frontier, being unable to locate many of the concealed German large field guns, were trying to do this in the following manner:

If a gun is fired sound waves are supposed to travel uniformly in all directions from the gun on the surface of the ground. About ten miles from a gun (which it is desired to locate) and within hearing distance of the report when the gun is fired, those microphones are located about a mile apart, each being attached to a rod driven in the ground. A man is stationed at each microphone who takes the time of the report heard on the microphone at which he is stationed. The times are then compared (all these operators having exactly the same watch time) and the microphones moved until by several success-

thru²

ive trials all these register the report of the gun, received through the ground waves, at exactly the same instant. Lines are then laid down connecting the center operator with the two others and perpendicular lines drawn from the center of these two lines. The gun is then supposed to be located at approximately the point where these perpendiculars intersect. Telephones connect the wing operators with the operator in the center in order to expediate the work.

(12) It was reported from Devonport that large numbers of 8"---13" guns of older types which had been discarded from the fleet in recent years, had been overhauled, their muzzles shortened and sent to France in November for use at the front.

(13) The Andacious was sunk by striking a mine about ten one morning when cruising to the northward of Ireland. The mine exploded exactly amidships, under the engine rooms and so damaged the center longitudinal and center line bulkhead that it was impossible to stop the inflow of water. The Olympic took the Audacious in tow and was unable to make much headway account of the helm being jammed hard over. About 7 p.m. the buoyancy of the ship had been so reduced that it was decided to transfer the crew to the Liverpool which was standing by. Within a half hour after the crew had been transferred the Audacious turned turtle and immediately afterwards exploded and large pieces of her hull were hurled clear over and beyond the Liverpool, which was within 800 yards. One man on the Liverpool was struck by a flying piece of plating and killed. It was thought that the high explosive shells exploded when they dropped from the bottoms to the tops of the shell rooms, as the ship turned over. This report came from one of the Liverpools crew.

(14) The Bulwark was supposed, by rumor, to have been blown up due to the dropping of a whip loaded with high explosive shells. Ammunition was being taken aboard in great haste and all the ammunition passage ways were all open and strewn with shells. The explosion occurred within 5 minutes of time to knock off for breakfast, and the ship disappeared in less than 2 minutes.

(15) While en route from England to New York a fellow passenger who said he was an American who had been living in Hamburg stated that he knew positively that the Germans were removing all turrets from their dreadnoughts, and mounting 16 inch guns on deck without turrets. He stated that he had just come from Germany. It is hard to credit this statement.

(16) An American newspaper man who was acquanted with one of the British officers at Devonport, England, stated that this officer told him the new British battleships under construction were fitted with three bottoms, upward from the turn of the bilge to the water line.

(17) There are supposed to be a total of thirty British cruisers in the Atlantic, guarding transatlantic commerce.

(18) On December 2d, it was strongly rumored in London, that two German cruisers had escaped into the Atlantic, for the purpose, presumably of commerce raiding.

3. When I first went abroad after the beginning of the war I felt strongly pro-allies. While in England I held to this feeling and to the opinion that the allies must win in the end. After visiting Belgium and returning to England the difference in spirit in England and Germany caused me to completely lose my pro-allies feeling and feel absolutely neutral. I still feel that the Germans must lose in the end, although it seems to me that the war must last two or three years. It appears that the Germans will hold their own on land but fail on the sea.

A. C. Hooper

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.] Need not be returned.

SUBJECT BRITISH PATROL TO KEEP SHIPS FROM THE NORTH SEA.

From Z No. 48 Date January 19, 1915. 191 .

Replying to O. N. I. No. Date . 191

Reference:- Z-344 of November 7th 1914.

The Navigating officer of the British auxiliary cruiser "VIKNOR", while taking a prize to Kirkwall, is reported to have stated that the British patrol to search vessels entering and leaving the North Sea extends from the Orkneys to Iceland and is maintained by about one hundred and seventy five armed steam trawlers with a number of auxiliary cruisers and some regular cruisers.

All vessels clearing to or from ports of North Europe are communicated to the scouting line by radio. In the case of the Norwegian-American liner "BERGENSFJORD" seven vessels of the patrol fleet were especially designed to search for her, as she was reported to have 50 German reservists on board.

These vessels proceeded to the westward of the regular line and executed a scouting maneuver until the ship in question was picked up.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1905.] *Need not be returned.*

SUBJECT CONDITIONS OBSERVED AT MEDITERRANEAN PORTS OF FRANCE.

From Y (b) *No.* 11 *Date* January 20, 1915.

Replying to O. N. I. No. *Date*

1. Acting under orders of the Naval Attache, Paris, together with Lieut. B. L. Smith, U.S.M.C., I visited from Dec. 12 to 19, 1914, a number of ports on the Mediterranean coast of France between Nice and Marseilles.

The following conditions were remarked : -

2. Nice. - Two small torpedoboats were moored in the harbor, evidently stationed there permanently. There were no other naval vessels, nor, according to the townspeople, had any visited there recently. There were no signs of naval activity, and even the civilian aeroplane club to the west of the town was quite deserted. There were a great many French soldiers in town, mostly Alpine chasseurs. The chief military use of Nice, and in fact of all the towns on the Rivièra at present, is as a drill station for newly mobilized recruits and as a hospital station, especially for convalescents. In Nice alone there are more than 200 hospitals, a large number of the great hotels being used for that purpose.

3. From Nice we went by automobile along the coast to Marseilles.

4. Cannes. - Nothing of naval interest, nor even any ships in the harbor except a number of yachts secured for the winter.

5. Fréjus. - Nothing of naval interest. The naval hydro-aeroplane station, which we could only see from a distance, showed no signs of activity and appeared to be closed and entirely out of use.

6. Toulon. - Six large destroyers were moored in the commercial port, and the masts and stacks of several naval

ships could be seen above the walls of the navy yard, to which admittance was absolutely refused by the commandant. The arsenal was reported to be working day and night at full working capacity, manufacturing naval war materiel, but the only visible evidence of any unusual activity was the great number of naval officers and bluejackets from the arsenal who thronged the hotels and streets of the town.

7. Marseilles. - There were no naval vessels in port and no signs of naval activity. The port was a scene of great activity. A great number of ships were discharging food stuffs and other material in boxes which may have been war material, and several transports were discharging soldiers, French regulars and colonial troops from Africa and the East, as well as English regulars from the colonies and many Indian troops. It was reported that thousands of Canadian and Australian troops have passed through the port. On the outskirts of the city were large camps of Indian troops.

8. From Marseilles we went by automobile toward Paris, along the banks of the Rhône. In all the towns along the route as far north as Lyons we noticed great numbers of soldiers, mostly newly mobilized men under instruction. This was especially noticeable at Avignon, which seems to be a great instruction camp.

C O N F I D E N T I A L .

REPORTED LOSS OF THE BRITISH BATTLESHIP "ERIN"

Need not be returned.

Z 50 January 30, 1915.

I was told at the Turkish Embassy to-day that they had information which they considered reliable that the British battleship "E R I N " , originally built for the Turkish Navy had been sunk some time ago while undergoing her trials, probably by a German submarine.

Two secretaries of the Embassy told me that Turkey would never have gone into the present war, had not the British Government taken over the two battleships building for her in England.

The national pride had been particularly hurt at this proceeding, as the money had been procured at the greatest sacrifice, and the interest of the whole country had been aroused to make adequate defense against their local enemies.

Jan. 23, 1915

Need not be returned.

Z

THE ENGLISH FLEET ON THE BELGIAN COAST.

Translation:

The Naval Expert of the "Times" lifts the veil concerning the naval division of the English which is operating on the Belgian coast. According to his communication the fleet consists of two battleships, three monitors, one cruiser, several gunboats and sloops and a number of torpedo boats. To these must be added some French destroyers and a gunboat. Under the title "The German Submarines Found Wanting" the expert triumphantly states in the "Times" of September 30th that the German submarines have not succeeded in doing any damage to the English ships which have again opened up the way to Ostend to the Allies, altho the German coast batteries have "scored some hits". Meanwhile the destruction of the "FORMIDABLE" has enlightened him.

Jan. 23, 1915

Need not be returned.

ENGLISH MISGUIDANCE.

Translation:

The English complaints concerning the bombardment of Hartlepool, Whitby and Scarborough are used for advertising for recruiting purposes. Their repetition from time to time demands a denial, since in those English publications which are destined for abroad the false statement repeatedly recurs that the Germans have bombarded an unfortified place. That the bombardment of Hartlepool, Whitby and Scarborough was permissible according to International Law is shown from a study of "The Monthly Arm List" a section of "Coast Defences", the "Monthly Navy List" and a section from "Coast guard". The statements contained in these Army and Navy lists, which are published "by authority" state what everyone knows and what Scarborough knew and that is that a battery of quick-firing 15 cm. guns was emplaced north of the houses of Scarborough and some 200 meters inland.

If the English did not use all of their guns in replying to the fire or not all of the guns were supplied with guns crew, it was due, perhaps, to the fact that these guns were in part of an old construction or because of economical grounds were received in an unserviceable condition, it seems that the blame of bombarding unfortified places rests on these grounds. The facts which are available from authentic neutral sources are that the garrison were prepared when the Germans opened up their well-directed fire.

Badly served and badly equipped fortresses remain, however, fortresses, even if their use discloses their small military worth. And the fact that they replied to the fire of the besieger offers no better proof than if the German ships, even in the smallest degree, had suffered damage and loss.

The signal station at Whitby served a military purpose; its destruction was therefore necessary. If in the destruction of this further damage was done, the inhabitants should be held responsible because they permitted the erection of this signal station in the vicinity of the houses of peaceful citizens.

The best proof that the intent of the German ships was the destruction of important military positions is the statement, in the Whitby weekly paper, of the officer in command of the coast watch station who says that all the shots were directed at the signal station.

The English publications in very bad taste present illustrations of the dead and wounded non-combatants and attempt in this way to influence the emotional in foreign lands. How much of such feeling is evidenced in England is shown by the expression of an English Naval officer:

"If I am in command when war breaks out I shall issue my orders: 'The essence of war is violence. Moderation in war is imbecility. Hit first, hit hard and hit anywhere.' "

This English Naval officer is now in command; he is named Lord John Fisher and is the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.

RECORD MISCONDUCT:

Summary:

The English commentator concerning the comparison of Portsmouth and Portsmouth's sea base for expeditions with Portsmouth's naval operations seems to have been a British attempt to distract from the fact that the British had failed to establish a base in the Pacific.

It has generally been said that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, it was a surprise attack, and that the British had been caught napping. But the British had been caught napping in the Pacific, too, and the British had been caught napping in the Pacific, too, and the British had been caught napping in the Pacific, too.

Pearl Harbor attack.

"If I am to do my duty to the Navy, I must do it in the manner I think most advantageous to the Navy."

Admiral Kimmel's duty was to defend the Pacific Fleet against the Japanese attack, and he did so by the best means available to him at the time.

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Jan. 23, 1915

Need not be returned.

Translation: NORDDEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG -

First of all there is no doubt that we are not bound by any international agreement in this naval bombardment. The only agreement under consideration here is in the ninth Hague conference of October 18th, 1907, concerning naval bombardments in war time, which finds no application in the present war, since it was not ratified by all the belligerents; hence in conformity with Article 8, the Powers agreeing are not bound. The decision of the Conference must only be observed in this direction when it conforms to general international principles. Whether after this the bombardment of unfortified places is forbidden, will not be determined without further agreement. In the Crimean war, English ships bombarded open Russian coast towns.

The German Navy has, however, adhered strictly to the agreement of the Hague Conference. All fortified places, as well as all military establishments in unfortified places according to Articles 1 and 2 are subject to bombardment.

Hartlepool belongs, according to the official British monthly Army List, to the coast defences; which in peace, as well as war time, is garrisoned by troops. They used their batteries against the attacking German ships. To be sure, Scarborough is not shown in the British Army List as a fortified coast station; however, the northern end of the town is protected by a wire barricade and on the sea side with entrenchments and a battery of six 15 centimeter quick firing guns; at Scarborough Rock are barracks and at the southern end of the town is an official wireless station. Whitby has, according to the official British monthly Navy list, a coast watch which in peace and war is garrisoned by the British Marine. The Germans directed their shots only towards these places, as has been stated from British sources.

It follows as a matter of course that because of the military situation the notification of the bombardment provided in Article 2, Par.1 and Article 6 of the Hague Conference could not be issued without endangering the success of the undertaking and consequently was not made.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Jan. 23, 1915

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WEEKLY POLITICAL SUMMARY.

German Airships in England - The alleged International Law Violation - The List of Losses of the Cruiser Squadron - Sturdee's Recognition - American Violations of Neutrality - The Insuring of the People's Subsistence - Golden Peace.

By Paul Michaelis

Translated from the Berliner-Tageblatt of Sunday, 24 January, 1915.

The attack of some German naval air ships upon fortified places on the English coast which took place in the night of the 19 to 20th of January has awakened fear and wrath in England. Not that, according to reports so far received, which most probably give only a small part of the facts, the action resulted in special damage to persons and material; but they say openly in England that this is only a sample of the active participation of the German air ships in the fight against insular England. And they are asking themselves what will happen if the German Zeppelins come again in greater number and perhaps also with heavier armament. Whether the defensive measures prescribed by the English government will guard against air attacks and landings effectively remains to be seen. And little as one may overestimate the practical result of the first attempt, still there is a double effect established: first, that a trip across the North Sea into the heart of England offers no difficulty to our air cruisers; and second, that these, although fired upon by the English, returned unharmed. So the English press, setting aside its befogging and its threatenings which as yet have not been realized, must confine itself to giving as strong expression as possible to its indignation over the unfriendly German warfare. On the German side one has to draw the conclusion that this first attempt, even though it were only a pin-prick, was a right painful one for the English pride, and that the English may not without justice fear that the pin-prick may be followed by a dagger thrust.

England has ever been a master of the Pharisee's art, seeing the splinter in the brother's eye and taking no account of the beam in their own. So the English have with remarkable cleverness discovered in the air attack a violation of international law, although it could be said even of England that she can not be regarded exactly as an authority in questions of international law. The German Government could reply with full justification that it was English fighting aircraft which bombarded the unfortified ~~town~~ Freiburg in Breisgau and dropped bombs on the island of Langeoog. One must not forget, in this connection, that English guns have reduced the open Daressalaam and other unfortified places in our colonies to ruin and ashes. In spite of that, our air ships did not aim at open places but on the contrary at the coast fortifications of Great Yarmouth. That they were obliged in the course of their voyage to reply to attacks from terra firma the English must blame themselves for, since a belligerent can hardly feel obliged to respect the police dispositions of the enemy Power concerning intercourse with air craft. ~~In the~~

In the last few days the list of the rescued officers and men from our East-Asiatic Cruiser Squadron has been published. Sad to say, it is very short, and so much longer is the list of those killed in the glorious battle. Of the Cruiser "SCHARNHORST" there is only the laconic

ntion, that none were saved. The entire ship's company, from the perior commander to the lowest stoker, died a hero's death for the therland. Their country mourns these many gallant sons, and at the me time is proud that they, who could not be victorious over a crush-g superiority, held out to the death. The English Vice Admiral, Sir Sturdee, who had first trebly concealed himself before engaging in fight with the German Squadron, has paid a patronizing tribute to the rman gallantry. That appears all the more unfitting since he seeks make it acceptable to his English hearers by some hateful calumnies. e Germans", he says,"are fine people when they are not doing violence neutrals nor bombarding open coast towns". Now in doing violence to utrals and bombarding open places England beats every record. Just mpare the behavior of the German submarine that sank the English eamer "DURWARD" recently. Her crew showed the highest consideration, spite of their own great danger. They not only gave the steamer's ew time to escape into their boats, but also then towed the boats to e nearest lightship, to deliver them in safety. Had an English cruis-happened along, she would have sent the German submarine to the bot-m, regardless of this charitable service.

It is only a demand of the merciless logic of war to pay back the glish in their own coin. As they do not for a moment hesitate to cut f from us every import, in order by hunger and distress to humble the rman people whom they cannot conquer by open fight on the field and e sea; so it must be also for the German Empire an unavoidable neces-ty to do all possible damage to English import. The official commu-cation of the German Government concerning the American supply of war ntraband shows with full clearness that as it has been hitherto it n go no further. The question will be raised quite properly, whether trade in arms with France and England to an extent unallowable international law, neutrality has not been actually violated, if by the American government, then surely by the American people. It in the long run quite impossible to look quietly on at these doings thout making every exertion in our power to apportion the inflow of ght and sun from abroad among all belligerents equally. If for that rpose our air ships and submarines can be effectively employed, it uld be the extreme of unpractical deference to reject their coopera-on.

But however our enemies may exert themselves to augment their wer of resistance by means of the friendly support of neutral powers, e main thing will ever remain, now as before, to hold faithfully to e iron resolution, to hold out, in the West as in the East, before e enemy as in our own country. The Minister of the Interior von bell has written to Professor Sering truly, that the task today is place every household in readiness for war. Like the soldier who es not fulfil his duty and accountability to the last breath, so ery German sins who is not willing to help the carrying out all the asures for insuring the subsistence of our people. There is nowhere y opposition to their aim. A difference of opinion exists only as whether the regulations hitherto made will accomplish a limitation of nsumption and the disposition of our corn supply for the desired purpose. us the Privy Chancellor, Professor Julius Wolff, in a thorough dis-ssion in "New Germany" of the dispositions hitherto made for the sup-y of the German bread stuff requirements during the war, comes to the nclusion that the whole issue of laws covering the corn supply hither-were made haphazard. In higher circles also it is clear that it is t yet impossible to make an agreement in the matter of measures to taken by the allied governments. It must only not be overlooked at the regulation of this problem will be all the more difficult the nger they cast about for a solution.

Under any circumstances the German people will only come happily rough the trial of this hard time if every single one proves by

deed that he is imbued with the sense of duty to the Fatherland and has the will to serve the whole. And the same holds good of bringing about a new order of things. Whether peace be far or near it is the duty of the Conservative leader, Herr von Heydebrand to agree that the coming peace may be a peace not merely one of the diplomat's art but rather one that the whole German people may understand and approve. To attain this end it is pertinent that the people should be able to make their claims seasonably and emphatically valid. Then only shall be achieve the golden peace which von Hindenburg had in view in his New Year greeting, one which will bring further increase and prosperity to the whole country.

Need not be returned.

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1900)

SUBJECT New Submarines for Italian Navy.

From T *No.* 29. *Date* January 25, 1915.

Replying to O. N. 1. No. ---------- *Date* ----------

1. Referring to "T" 320 of December 14, 1914, I have to report that on this day contract was closed with the Fiat San Giorgio Company by the Italian Navy Department for the construction of six submarines. The Royal Decree giving the name ARGONAUTA to the first of these as reported in "T" 26 of January 19, 1915, stated that this boat was an improved type of the Medusa Class which entered service in 1911. In addition to these six I hear two more will be constructed at the Royal Arsenal at Venice, and two at the Royal Arsenal at Spezia.

2. I have heard it rumored that instead of there being two boats built at Spezia there will be four, making the total twelve instead of ten. But this I cannot confirm.

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1900)

Need not be returned.

SUBJECT French Battleship Jean Bart struck by Austrian Torpedoe.

From T *No.* 32. *Date* January 25, 1915.

Replying to O. N. I. No. _____ *Date* _____

1. The following information is probably on file at the Navy Department, but it has only been heard in naval circles here today.

2. The press reported several weeks ago that an Austrian Submarine had torpedoed a Frennh Battleship of the Courbet Class which was followed by denial from the French Government that the Courbet had been damaged. I now learn that the Jean Bart is in drydock at Malta as a result of having been struck by one torpedoe directly under the bow inflicting only small amount of damage. It is expected that she will be ready for service within a month from this date.

Need not be returned.

SUBJECT Information regarding British ships.

From X *No.* 15 *Date* 25 January *, 1915*

Replying to O.N.I. No. 13268 *Date* 7 January *, 1915*

The Una is the old German yacht "Meteor", which was captured by the Australians in the Bismark Archipeligo; she is now included in the Australian Navy.

The Botha and Tipperary are the third and fourth of a lot of six Chilian destroyers being built in England; they are of 1430 tons displacement.

The Cambrian, Imperieuse, and Wallaroo were withdrawn from sale and are now probably being used as harbour vessels. The Cambrian is a protected cruiser of 7000 tons, the Imperieuse an armored cruiser of 8,400 tons, and the Wallaroo a protected cruiser of 2,575 tons.

The Royal Oak will be completed about October 1st,1915, She was only launched on November 19,1914.

In so far as can be ascertained, the two Norwegian ships under construction have not been taken over by the Admiralty.

It has unofficially been stated that the Chilian battleship Almirante Cochrane has been taken over and named the Audacious.

Feb 8 15

WEEKLY POLITICAL SUMMARY.

Translation: BERLINER TAGEBLATT, January 25,1915.

German Airships in England -- The Assumed Violation of International Law -- The List of Those Lost of the Cruiser Squadron -- Sturdee's Appreciation -- American Violation of Neutrality -- The Safeguarding of the People's Foodstuffs -- The Golden Peace.
------PAUL MICHAELIS.

The attack of several German naval airships on fortified places on the English coast which occurred on the night of the 19th-20th of January, has awakened fright and indignation throughout that country. According to reports from English sources up to date, which apparently only give a small part of the facts, the feat was productive of but little damage to people or material. One says openly in England that this was only a test in the problem of an active participation of German airships in the war against insular England. And it is further asked what will happen if the Zeppelins return in greater numbers and with perhaps a stronger armament? Whether the measures of defense instituted by the English Government against attack by airships and landing will suffice remains to be seen. One can overrate a little the practical effect of this first attempt since these two facts are conclusive: first, that our airships succeeded in making a trip across the North Sea into the heart of England without any marked difficulty and, secondly, that they returned uninjured after being shot at by the English. We can draw the conclusion from the German side that even if this first attempt was only a pin prick, it was painful for the English and that they will not wrongly fear that a real dagger thrust will follow this needle prick.

England from time immemorial has been a master in the art of the Parisees, seeing the mote in the eyes of their brother and not being aware of the beam in their own eye. The English with noteworthy adroitness have discovered in this air attack a violation of international law, as if she herself could pose as an authority on the question of international law. The German Government can rightly point out that it was an English aeroplane that bombarded the unfortified city of Freiburg in Breisgau and the island of Langevog. In this respect one must not forget that it was English guns which laid in ruins and ashes the unfortified port of Daressalaam and other places in our colonies. Our airships have only been directed against the coast defences of Great Yarmouth and not against unfortified places. That they were forced to reply during their trip to an attack from the earth, the English themselves are to blame, since a belligerent can scarcely be forced to observe the police regulations of a hostile Power in the traffic with airships.

There was recently published the list of the officers and crew of our Asiatic squadron saved in the battle off the Falkland Islands. It is sad that it is so short and that the list of those lost in this glorious fight is so large. Of the cruiser "SCHARNHORST" appears the laconic statement that no one was saved. The whole complement, from the commander-in-chief down to the last fireman, died a hero's death for the Fatherland. The country mourns that so many brave sons are dead but at the same time it is proud that they died realizing that they could not be victorious against an overwhelming superiority. The English Vice-Admiral, Sir F. Sturdee, who prudently had reinforced himself before he engaged the German squadron, has extolled the German bravery in a patronizing manner. One renounces this promptly, because he endeavors to placate his English hearers with several malicious insinuations. "The Germans", he says, "are an excellent people when they do not offer violence to neutrals or bombard unfortified coast cities." England has broken every record in assaulting neutrals and bombarding unfortified

places. One needs only to compare the conduct of the German submarine which recently sank the English steamer "DURWARD". The crew showed, notwithstanding their own danger, the greatest consideration in that they not only allowed the crew of the tramp time enough to leave their ship, but proceeded with the boat to the nearest lightship in order to bring them to safety. If an English cruiser had happened along during this act of friendly service, she would have unfeelingly sunk the submarine.

It is only a demand of inexorable war logic to retaliate to the English with suitable measures. As they do not scruple at every opportunity to cut us off from every supply in order to weaken the German people, whom they cannot conquer on land or sea, through hunger and need, so must the German Empire use every indispensable means to break off every supply of the English. The official publication of the Government concerning the delivery of war contraband by the Americans shows clearly that it cannot proceed further than before. With justice can the question be raised whether in this illicit international traffic in arms with France and England the American Government, as well as the American people, are not violating neutrality. It is impossible continually to view peacefully this condition without doing all that lies within our power to distribute equally the supply to all the belligerents. If the cooperation of our airships and submarines can contribute to this, it would be the acme of our regard.

As our enemies endeavor to increase their resistance through the friendly support of the neutral powers, the fact will always remain that the German nation holds out because of its iron will. This is shown in the western and eastern battlefields and before the enemy as well as in its own land. The Minister of the Interior v. Lobell has rightly written to Prof. Sering, the day demands that every household should place itself in a condition of war. As the soldier sins who does not do his duty to his last breath, so equally guilty is the German who does not willingly help to establish measures for safeguarding our people's welfare. Wrangling will not attain the object. There is a difference of opinion only as to whether the rules thus far in force attain the desired purpose in the limitation of the use and extension of our supply of grain. Prof. Julius Wolff, the Government advisor, in an article in the "New Germany" over the consumption of bread permitted during the war, arrives at the conclusion that all the legilation relative to the conservation of food stuffs has worked to no purpose. That the measures undertaken by the Allied Governments are not conclusive is clear to one in Government circles. We must not overlook the fact that this problem will be more difficult the longer one experiments with it.

The German people under all conditions will only overcome this difficult period of trial when every one of them is filled with a feeling of national duty and the desire to serve the whole is shown in the deed. Peace may be near or distant. Concerning this the conservative leader, Herr v. Heydebrand vouches the opinion that the coming peace should not only be a diplomatic peace but one which the whole German people understand and agree to: in order to attain this end, it behooves the people to assert their demands at the right time and in a vigorous manner. Only then will we attain that golden peace which von Hindenburg pictures in his New Year's message of thanks and which will bring prosperity and gladness to the whole land.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

Need not be returned.

SUBJECT Duty with the Brazilian War College.

From N No. 14 Date January 26, 1915?, 191

Replying to O. N. I. No. Date, 191

I have to make thefollowing report on the Brazilian War College.

The Brazilian War College finished its first session on January 23, 1915. Diplomas of graduation were awarded to ten officers who had taken the course. The diplomas were delivered by the President of the Republic, in the presence of the Minister of Marine and all the higher officers of the Navy.

The War College course lasts from April until December and entitles the graduates to certain privaleges. The Commander in Chief the Commanders of Squadrons and certain other officers must chose at least one officer who is a graduate of the War College as members of their staffs.

The War College course at present partakes of the nature of a post graduate course for the Naval Academy, together with that of a War College. As in all other Nav l matters in this country, there is a leaning toward French ideas and customs.

There does not seem to be any example of what may be called college or university teaching in this country and the present inclination at theWar College, is strongly toward the form of education which consists of lectures prepared by regular instructors with examinations at the end of the course.

The War College course is now being revised and it is hoped that some of these features may be modified. The result of the first years work was however very creditable, although much of it was not closely connected with what we consider War College subjects.

The French ide of administration is for example very prevalent and tends to lose sight of the thing to be administered in perfecting the machinery of administration.

During the months th t I have been on duty I have had charge

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1900)

Need not be returned.

SUBJECT Budget for Fiscal Year 1915-16.

Italian Navy.

From T *No.* 32. *Date* January 27, 1916.

Replying to O. N. I. No. ——— *Date* ———

1. Referring to "T" 3.. dated December 16, 1914, to reconcile the difference between the total amount estimated of Lire [illegible],717,686.03 and the total given in the table of Lire 47,896,707.00 there is an appropriation for the Mercantile Marine of 30,021,479.[illegible] lire which was not noted in that report.

2. It will be noted that there is a sum of 5,000,000 lire to be refunded to the Treasury on the outstanding balance of indebtedness to that Department of lire 56,000,000. In addition to this 5,000,000 lire, this year's Budget allows for the refund of 30,000,000 lire to the Budget of 1914-15 which was advanced for necessary expenses of that year which had not been contemplated in the formation of that Budget; thus, this year's Budget, 1915-16, of a total of [illegible],717,686.03 is really decreased by 35,000,000 lire for the needs of the Navy and the Merchant Marine.

3. This year's Budget is greater than last year's by lire 4,000,549 which is made up by an increase in ordinary expenses of lire 14,[illegible],750. and a decrease in the extraordinary expenses of 10,010,000 lire which gives the resulting increase of lire 5,97[illegible],750. To this there is an additional amount of lire 21,7[illegible]. charged to transfer of funds to the Treasury Department which gives the total increase of this year's Budget over last year's Budget for the aforesaid amount of lire 4,000,549.

4. The items of particular interest under the appropriation for the "Marine Militaire" consist of 400,000 lire for the aeronautical service which is divided into 35,000 lire for the personnel and 365,000 lire for the maintenance of material, etc.; of the amount of 100,0[illegible],000 lire for the construction of new ships and the maintenance of existing ones, this being divided into 56,000,000 lire for naval construction and 34,000,000 lire for armament. In the allowance for enlisted personnel of the lower ratings of 17,7[illegible],7[illegible] lire there is considered an increase of 1000 men for the amount of 316,7[illegible] lire.

5. Attention is invited to "T" 31 of November 30, 1914, where there was an additional appropriation of 300,000,000 lire allowed the Navy Department, but there is no way of ascertaining what part of this amount, if any, was allotted to naval construction.

6. The Budget which is forwarded at this time has not yet been voted upon by Parliament

A C T I O N in the N O R T H S E A
of JANUARY 24th 1915.

Need not be returned.

Z 69 January 27, 1915.

The following information is mostly from a report of Admiral von I n g e n o h l, Commander-in-chief of the North Sea Fleet which was shown me at the Reichs-Marine-Amt. I was requested not to give this information to other attachés.

The report in question dealt mainly with injuries received, or given, so that many points of this interesting action remain to be cleared up.

The forces involved on the German side were under the command of Viceadmiral H i p p e r flying his flag on the "SEYDLITZ" and accompanied by the battle cruisers "DERFFLINGER" and "MOLTKE", the armored cruiser "BLUECHER", 4 light cruisers, of which the "KOLBERG" was one and two destroyer flotillas (if full strength 32). In addition, at the end of the action 70 miles W N W from Helgoland, there was on the scene the "Zeppelin" " L 5 " and at least one submarine.

The British force is reported to have been under the command of Vice Admiral B e a t t y and to have consisted of five battle cruisers, 4 light cruisers and a flotilla of destroyers reported here to have been about thirty.

It appears probable that the German ships were on a raid to the English coast and were near it at the time the British fleet appeared. Being considerably overmatched, the German squadron turned at once and retreated at full speed hampered by the slowness of the "BLUECHER" which can do about 25 knots at her best. The engagement started at 9.30 and lasted three hours.

The battle appears to have developed into a fight between two columns at very long range. The "BLUECHER", for reasons I do not know, dropped behind, and was sunk, after resisting to the end. In the meantime one of the German torpedo-boats which was in advance and on the engaged side of the column developed leaky tubes and fell back nearly midway between the two engaged columns where she fired her torpedoes at very long range and passed down the whole line without being fired at and subsequently returned to port.

It appears probable that the German Admiral was rapidly bringing the British fleet into waters dangerous to them, as a German submarine reports having sunk a British destroyer about the time the British fleet hauled off.

The following information is quoted as nearly as possible from Admiral von I n g e n o h l' s report and is confidential:- " The torpedoboat which passed between the columns, V 204 (I think) reported that she fired her torpedoes at very long range. Nine minutes after firing, the second ship in the British column sheered out and subsequently sank. The Commanding officer of " L 5 " (Zeppelin airship) reports that subsequent to the action he saw only four British battle cruisers which made off to the North westward. The gunnery officer of the "MOLTKE" reports seeing a British battle cruiser

sink.

The commanding officer of the "KOLBERG" reports he saw British light cruisers and destroyers hurrying to a point where steam and smoke were rising in great volumes over the ocean.

Other damage to the English fleet reported:- The commanding officer and other officers and men of the "KOLBERG" saw a British destroyer under their file blow up and sink.

The commanding officer of the submarine (number not noted) which joined near the end of the action reports that he fired at two British destroyers which were close together and when he came to the surface seven minutes later only one destroyer was visible and he believes he made a hit and sank the other.

Report of damage of their own ships besides the loss of the "BLUECHER" :-

"SEYDLITZ" :-	None killed, eight wounded, slight damage.
"DERFFLINGER" :-	Some of the powder in one turret burned and injured some of its crew. Damage to turret not known, but reported to be repairable in a few days. Whether caused by flare-back, or by enemies fire so far not given out.
"MOLTKE :-	Not hit. No damage.
"KOLBERG" :-	Two killed, six or eight wounded in a fight with a Britsih light cruiser and destroyers.

All German ships, except "BLUECHER" reported to have returned to their base.

The activities of the airship " L 5 ", if any, could not be ascertained.

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From the foregoing and from what was said in conversation I draw the following deductions:-

1. That there was practically no maneuvering before or during the action.

2. That high speed was maintained at all times.

3. That the "BLUECHER", from the beginning, was a hindrance and of no assistance to the German squadron. Her slow speed (relative to battle cruisers) and her eight inch guns made her for the duty she was performing as a unit in a battle cruiser squadron a ship which could neither fight nor run away. Having reciprocating engines, she was more liable in a long chase at full speed to hot bearings or other machinery defects than the turbine ships.

4. That the strategy of the German Admiral was to draw the superior English fleet into waters dangerous to its safety from submarines and possibly mines.

5. That the British Admiral had the choice of ranges and kept at the extreme limit as his squadron was armed with 13.5 inch. and 12 inch against 11 inch and 8 inch. of the German squadron.

6. That the presence of submarines on the scene of battle at once caused the opposite fleet to draw off.

7. That in the smoke and confusion of the battle torpedoboat attack in daytime is possible.

8. That a British battle cruiser was torpedoed and badly damaged under water, and had to fall out of the column during the action. That this ship actually sank remains a matter of doubt, although it is possible that she did.

9. That the German torpedoboats, launched in 1911-12 are armed with a torpedo with a range of at least 7000 metres.

10. That the minimum range of the battle cruiser squadrons was about 14,000 metres.

11. That the German light cruisers did not fight as a squadron together, but more or less independent actions to keep the main column from destroyer attack.

12. That the German main body kept torpedoboats protecting the head of the column from torpedo attack and threatening the British main body with torpedo attack. Probably the British did the same.

Detailed confirmations of these deductions will be sought.

Supplemented by T 218(a)

GERMAN CRUISER "GAZELLE" TORPEDOED BY RUSSIAN SUBMARINE. (British)

Z 70 January 27, 1915.

On the 25th of January the German light cruiser "GAZELLE" was torpedoed by a submarine near the Island of Rügen in the Baltic Sea.

The submarine is believed to have belonged to the Russian Navy with possibly an English crew.

The "GAZELLE" returned to port and reports no loss of personnel and only slight damages.

The following translation of an article published in the "Hamburger Nachrichten" claims that the Submarine was British. The truth of the claim I am unable to verify. :-

" The half successful attack on the small cruiser "GAZELLE" is the second success which the English submarines can record in their present career which up to date was not very glorious. The first time the small cruiser "HELA" fell victim to an English submarine in the North Sea, and as far the nationality of the submarine is concerned which fired at the "GAZELLE", there can be no doubt. The presence of English submarines in the Baltic Sea has been known for some time. As these submarines could have only reached the Baltic Sea through one of the narrows between the Danish Islands the respect of England as to the neutrality of the smaller sates has been again strikingly demonstrated. England respects the neutrality of others only when it is useful to them. But these attacks teach one thing which is — very pleasing. The "HELA" was nearly the oldest ship of the German fleet. It cannot therefore be assumed ~~xxxxxx~~ that the protection against injuries below the waterline was an especial good one, and yet the ship kept over water, after receiving a full hit, considerable time, and the loss on life was insignificant. This time the torpedo did not even sink the very light "GAZELLE" (the name indicates a very light ship) The ship apparently reached port with her own power and there was no loss of any members of the crew. It may now be believed that the hit was not a complete one. But in comparing the fate of these German ships and those of the English armored ships which fell victims to German submarines, the thought is near that very probably the torpedo of the English is not up to ours. It is very probabl

also that the English arrangements of bulkheads is inferior to ours. For if armored cruisers and battleships on the English side sink with all on board like struck by lightning, while the much smaller German ships keep over water considerably, there must be a very strong difference between the two means of attack in general and apparently proves the technical superiority of the German fleet in this respect.

LOSS OF BRITISH AUXILIARY CRUISER " VICKNOR".

Z 71 January 27, 1915.

This ship is reported from the English press to have gone down with all hands and the theory is advanced that it was from running on a German mine.

It is possible that this is correct and also possible that she was the victim of submarine attack.

This ship belonged to the patrol off the North of England and is mentioned in report Z-49 of January 19, 1915, as having been the ship which stopped and sent in the Norwegian-American liner "BERGENSFJORD".

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1900)

Need not be returned

SUBJECT Class of 1891 called to colors - Italian Navy.

From T No. 40. Date January 28, 1915.

Replying to O. N. 1. No. ——— Date ———

1. A Royal Decree just published notifies all members of the Class 1891 of the Navy that they are called to the colors.

2. This Decree only states that these men should stand by for the actual notification by the Minister of the Marine, but they shall consider themselves in all respects as having been called. The Minister of the Marine has not at this date set any specific time for their reporting for duty.

Need not be returned.

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900)

SUBJECT Conditions - Italy - January 12-31, 1915.

From T *No.* 42. *Date* January 31, 1915.

Replying to O. N. I. No. ------- *Date* ----------

1. The previous report on the internal conditions covered the period from January 1st to January 11th, and since then a subsequent report has been made on the earthquake. Of course the earthquake is still the subject of paramount importance. But the people are growing calmer and less apprehensive.

2. On January 30th the Government, to meet the clamors of the unemployed, who were being hard pressed by the Socialists, decreed free entry of grain throughout Italy - that is the internal tax. A reduction of 50% was also made in the freight charges on grain. The situation had become very serious as demonstrations against the Government were being held throughout the land. The Socialists threatened a general strike throughout Italy - which by many meant a revolution, if the price of bread was not lowered. The people held that the Government had, by holding up large quantities of grain, encouraged speculation in that necessity, and the people were the sufferers.

3. There is more talk of war today than ever before, it being favored by the majority of Italians not only expecting to retake Triest and Trentino but also to bring about a cessation of hostilities resulting in peace. It seems to be the general opinion of military men that, if Italy enters the war, she will attack Austria by sending her troops across the Adriatic, probably through Montenegro. I have not found a single Italian, either in civil life or in the military, who does not say that war is bound to come. A member of one of Rome's oldest and most aristocratic families has just re-enlisted for a period of six weeks although his military service had expired a few days previous. He states that war is inevitable. The general impression is that upon the re-assembling of Parliament, on February 18th, some definite decisions will be made.

4. On January 30th, several additional cathegories of four Army Classes were called to colors for periods covering from five to seven weeks. This, according to the Decree was for instruction purposes and does not necessarily mean an increase in the total of men under arms and in the field. As it has been the practice that upon the reporting of new cathegories those that have been doing service have been granted furlough, thus the actual number of men under arms has not been changed.

Need not be returned.

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900)

SUBJECT Requisition of Ships for the use of the Italian Government.

From T No. 34. Date January 28, 1915.

Replying to O. N. I. No. ------- Date ----------

1. Below is a translation of a Royal Decree covering the requisition of various kinds of ships for Government use. It will be presented to Parliament to be made into a Law.

Art. 1. When circumstances of public necessity or general interest of the State require it, the Government will proceed to requisition merchant vessels, pleasure craft and other kinds of sea-faring craft under the following rules.

Art. 2. The requisition may be ordered by the Minister of the Marine or by his deputation, by local port authorities in Italy or in the colonies and by Consular authorities, or by commanding officers of ships in foreign waters. In case of urgent necessity the requisition can also be performed in the name of the Minister of the Marine by proper introduction, by local port authorities, by political authority, in Italy and in the Colonies, by Consular authorities or by Commanding Officers of ships in foreign waters.

Art. 3. The order of requisition will be by written notification to the Captain or to those in charge of the ship, or totthe owners or agents, or representatives, by the authority that makes the requisition, and must be immediately executed. It will be confirmed by later order from the Minister of the Marine to the owners or agents. To the order of requisition will be attached a description of the cargo and of the other materials on board.

Art. 4. The contract for the enlistment of the crew will continue in operation during the requisition.

Art. 5. There will be organized a Commission of requisition attached to the Ministry of the Navy whose duty will be to act in accordance with the freight rates of the preceding 18 days, the amount of compensation to which the owners or agents are entitled tat not to those who have previously made a contract with the Ministry. The Commission will be constituted as follows:

1st. President - Commander,
2d. An Official from the upper grades of the Central Administration of the Merchant Marine,
3d. A Line Officer attached to the Service "Transportation".
4th. An Officer of the General Staff of the Army "Transportation".
5th. A Representative of the Steamship Companies.
6th. A Delegate from the Judicial Department.
7th. A Delegate from the Treasury Department.

The members of the Commission will be nominated by orders from the Minister of the Marine according to those designated by the Ministries concerned.

An appeal can be made to the Minister of the Marine upon decisions of the Commission, but his decision will be final after consulation with the Superior Council of the Merchant Marine.

Art.6th. While the final decision of the Commission is being formulated, as regards the proper amount of compensation, the owners or agents will be allowed two-thirds of the total amount estimated. The payments will be made in fifteen days instalments.

Art. 7. The Government binds itself to the payment of expenses of the ship during the period of requisition with the exception of the Hospital Fund of the Merchant Marine, the Insurance against accidents, against the normal risks of navigation, the payments and salaries to the crew, and also the lubricants for machinery.

Art. 8. The return of a requisitioned ship to the owners must be announced ten days in advance. When possible, this return will be made at the port from which it was requisitioned unless otherwise agreed upon, when the agents or owners will be entitled to a rebate of expenses incurred by a voyage to the port previously named.

Art. 9. The ships will be returned in their former condition. At the expiration of the requisition a technical Commission nominated by the Minister of the Marine, will estimate the damage suffered by the ship in consequence of this impressed service, also for any modifications made during this period. The estimates made by this Commission will be referred to the Minister of the Marine for final approval.

Art.10. If necessary, on these vessels there will be detailed a naval Captain, or other Governmental Official to represent the Government. The duties of these officers will be fixed by Royal Decree.

Jan. 31, 1915.

1.32

WEEKLY POLITICAL SUMMARY.

Six months of War -- How Long Yet? -- The Emperor's Birthday -- "If It Had Not Been So -- The New Course -- Government Monopoly of Supplies. ----------PAUL MICHAELIS.

With the end of January the first half year of the war is finished. For the German people it has been six months of the greatest strain, enormous sacrifices and astonishing accomplishments. The first brilliant offensive movement in the west and east, which extensive operations have scarcely been paralleled in the world's history, was followed by months of apparent inactivity. The enemy assembled all his strength to combat the German attack and wherever possible to retaliate by counter attacks. In the west we retreated from the Marne to the Aisne and the first advance against Warsaw has not yet been crowned with complete success. Out of the midst of summer, in which the war began, winter has arrived with its short days, its storms, floods, fog and snowstorms. In place of an active offensive movement it has developed into a war of position. We must learn to wait patiently and prepare. During the last months, the Russians on the one hand and the French and English on the other thought the proper time had arrived to assume the offensive. We can safely say that on both fronts these attempts have been defeated. The Russian Army has been driven back to the proximity of Warsaw and their retreat from Galicia and other the Vistula is probable. Joffre's attempt to turn the tables cost the French a loss of 150,000 men, without attaining the slightest result. On the contrary, the German troops have attained important successes during the last month. In the bloody battles at Soissons they threw the French back over the Aisne with heavy loss in dead and prisoners and at La Bassee they successfully attacked the English. Ground was further won from the French on the heights of Craonne. Considering also the continued attacks of our troops in the Argonne we can see the successful result in that the iron wall of the German troops has at no point been broken through by the enemy but that, on the contrary, they have been forced to yield at different places. This as yet means nothing decisive but is simply a preparation for the final stroke. Bearing in mind that the German reserves still amount to several millions, that the domestic resources have increased rather than diminished during the last half year and that the will to carry the war through to a victorious conclusion pervades the German people, we can view coming events with trust.

How long will the war last? This question has been tersely answered by Gen. von Falkenhayn: "Until the enemy is so vanquished that a repetition of this unprovoked attack on us is one and for all time eliminated." Whether this desired object can be obtained in its entirety is open to doubt since we are cognizant of our enemies' strength today but not what their future will be. History has not always shown that great nations overcome and surmount the hardest blows of fate when they dispose of an unbroken energy. The view of this general, as well as of the diplomats concerning the future is narrowly limited by change in conditions. We must, however, agree with the chief of the General Staff in that we are decided to exert ourselves to the last in order to bring the war to a victorious conclusion for us.

The Emperor, whose birthday this year was celebrated in the simplest manner because of existing conditions, spoke to Ludwig Ganghofer about the wonderful spirit of enthusiasm which was evidenced during the first days of August. "It is the greatest joy to me that I was permitted to live to see this"; he added thoughtfully, "If this had not been so!" As a matter of fact no one knows what would have happened had not the German people risen as one man when the test came and had not their marvelous unanimity

in the last six months protected them. Our enemies speculated on the internal discord which would arise between parties and sections of the Empire and that then they would have an easy task. They were thoroughly deceived and we may add that they have overestimated their own security both from an internal as well as from an external viewpoint.

Just as little as it is necessary to worry that the German power can be injured because of internal antagonism, just so emphatically the duty must be pointed out which develops for the Government circles out of this brave determination of the people. If today the representatives of political and commercial progress advise renunciation, it is done in order that after the war we will not be in the position where we were six months ago. It is not merely that when peace is made the opinion of the people must be heard, but that at once after the war the complete liberty of the people must be granted. In the Reichstag in December Herr v. Bethmann Hollweg promised a new cure for the internal questions. During the present session of the Prussian Diet and Reichstag we can expect that they will acquaint themselves with this aversion to the former methods of German politics first of all in a similar treatment of parties and preparing reforms. We all know that whatever is the outcome of the war, the coming times impose hard duties upon the people. They will willingly bear the burdens only if the general belief prevails that the previous barriers between confessions, social distinctions, classes and parties are done away with and that insurmountable obstacles shall not again be placed in the way of a liberal tendency.

In the first place there are the requirements of the war. This is shown especially in the Governmental control of supplies which becomes active the first of February. This is a deep encroachment into the domestic life of the people and affects all, not merely the farmer but the miller and baker and the great mass of consumers. It is the result of a long number of more or less fortunate provisions for safeguarding the people's sustenance. We might have avoided this last measure if the Allied Governments (Germany and Austria-Hungary) had taken control of the supplies immediately after the last harvest. But as conditions had developed, there was no other choice. To be sure, one does not yet know how large the supply is which can be made use of. For this reason the first of February is designated as the period for the inventory of the amount of grain and meal supplies on hand. The general impression is that this inquiry will be productive of a more favorable result than the insufficient measures undertaken by the State on the first of last December. Even with a larger amount of economy in the use and carefulness in the distribution of supplies should be absolutely demanded. The communities will have to bear the burden in this measure. They may show what they can do in supplying the people with a palatable bread at a suitable price. That the people will acquiesce in these necessary measures goes without saying. They will cheerfully adapt themselves to these difficulties because each one will say to himself that he will do his part to thwart the threats of our enemies who wish to subjugate us by starvation. The more lasting our domestic preparations prove, the more easily will the German Army and Navy accomplish the tasks which confronts them during the further course of the war.

FF.